




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A LITTLE EUROPEAN LEXICON

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A LITTLE EUROPEAN LEXICON

by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa

1. Allow me to begin by thanking professor Cotta and the University of Siena for inviting me here, today. I have been in the university exclusively as a student, until five years ago when the University of Frankfurt (the town where I am now living) gave me an honorary professorship, which I try to honour by giving courses there. I have learned in a adult age what you have probably learned much earlier, namely, that the level of understanding required to teach and explain an issue to students, particularly students of an elementary course, has to be much deeper than the one needed to manage the same subject in the real world or in professional activity.

If I had to give a title to my lecture, it would be something like “A Little European Lexicon”. I will speak of a certain number of key words, which have marked the lexicon of Europe over the five and a half decades of its existence and which continue to be controversial and often misunderstood. This may appear, in a sense, an elementary task, but in another sense it is a complex one: in my view, the most complex thing is, at the end, to reason about words.

In the list of words I will review, there will be more adjectives than nouns. The nouns - such as Europe, Union, constitution, treaty - I shall tackle in passing, while much of the lecture will be on adjectives that have accompanied those few nouns.

A journey in the lexicon is particularly useful to understand European matters because, if it is true that in a scientific environment words are used to clarify, it is equally true that in the real world words are used to confuse and to dissimulate. Indeed, the higher the stake, the higher the level of dissimulation. For example, if you really want to have a union, you will *not* call it that way. And if you really do *not* want it, you will call it a union. Those who wanted a union called it a Community. Similarly, in the debate about the European Union, the word ‘constitution’ was launched by those who wanted to limit, and even dismantle, what had been constructed, not by those who wanted to take the decisive and final step towards a full political construct.

Note that there is nothing wrong with that. Politics, and perhaps human action in general, has a long and strong tradition in dissimulation. If you want to achieve something you often cannot afford to declare too explicitly. I see nothing to be condemned in that. There are indeed theories on the ‘virtuous dissimulation’, which belong to the reflection about politics of the 17th century. Walter Hallstein, a major architect of European unification, used to say, in French, “*il faut aller toujours tout droit*” (simulating a zig-zag with his hand). He wanted to indicate that in politics the most effective way to move in the direction of the set goal is often to stagger. Of course, you need to have a clear direction, but you cannot approach the goal in a straight line.

So, I think that searching into the meaning of words is revealing, because to have dissimulation, the one who acts has to know the precise meaning of words. Dissimulation requires two elements, clarity and confusion; if there is only confusion there can be no dissimulation.

In the following, I will take pairs, or strings, of words and go through them. The first pair I have in mind, is: economic and political. The second: private and public. The third: international, national, domestic, European. The fourth: supranational, intergovernmental, federal, communitarian.

Maybe I should begin with an indication of the meaning of the word ‘union’, which is now the key word. If you take the Oxford Dictionary (and I think that it is the case in almost any language where this word of Latin origin exists), you will find that ‘union’ means two things. First, it means the *state* of being united, and second, it means the *act* of getting united. I think there is no doubt that the European Union is a union in both the meanings of the word. Furthermore, there may be a deep sense in the fact that the word has this double meaning, which in a way, brings together the two things which are very different, the static and dynamic aspect.

2. Take now the first pair of words: *economic* and *political*. Economic is an adjective that qualifies a noun. It has qualified the noun ‘community’ from 1958 to 1992-1993, as I will explain later. Indeed, the word ‘union’ has come in a strong way into the European lexicon only through the Maastricht Treaty. Before Maastricht, the noun was ‘community’ and the qualifying adjective was ‘economic’. Hence: European Economic Community, EEC.

The question is whether the adjective ‘economic’ should be contrasted with the adjective ‘political’. By saying that the Community was economic, was it implied that it was *not* political? In my view, there are arguments going in opposite direction. In a way, it is true that the Community was economic and not political. In another way, however, this is totally false, and I will therefore try to explain this.

Why was it false to say that the European Economic Community, by being economic, did not mean to be, and indeed was not, political? I see various reasons for this.

The first reason is that the objective was clearly political. It is known that the driving objective, certainly in the 1950s, but also much later until well into the 1990s, was peace. There was a moment in the late 1990s, in which Helmut Kohl was the only person in Europe in power who did not intend to postpone launching of the single currency. And, his argument was: the single currency is ultimately a matter of war and peace. Part of the

political commentators and the press mocked at this statement as an exaggeration. Even for a man like Kohl, what mattered was clearly the political objective.

Second, the matter was political because the European Economic Community is about a reorganisation of power. If wealth is the object of economics, power is the object of politics; it was political.

Third, the conception and the leadership were strongly political. If one looks back to the 1950s, when the Treaty of Rome was stipulated, or also to the late 1980s, when the monetary heart of the Maastricht Treaty was stipulated, it clearly appears that the whole process was strongly driven by political leaders. Indeed, by political leaders who knew rather little about economics. Those politicians even went against the advice of their economic expert. Ludwig Erhard, the mythical Economic Minister who reconstructed the German economy in the 1950s, was against the Treaty of Rome. Thirty years later, many of the people in the economic and central banking profession were, to say the least, deeply sceptical about the single currency. Kohl, like Adenauer, but also like de Gasperi or Mitterrand, was a 'pure' politician who knew little about economics.

So, the adjective 'economic' does not exclude the political nature of the community. In fact, it is enough to look at what constitutes the substance of political debate, of political action and government activity in an ordinary country, to see that a very large proportion of it, maybe a half, maybe more, is economic in its content. So, if economic matters are one of the privileged contents of political action for a country, how could one deny that the nature of the Community, in spite of the adjective 'economic', was in fact political? In conclusion, it is false to say that 'economic' excludes 'political'.

In another sense, however, to say that 'economic' excludes 'political' is correct, because there is, I think, little doubt that what has been historically the essence of all political constructs, namely, the provision of security and peace, was not the specific object of the treaties of the 1950s. It was the end goal, but not the object. More political was, undoubtedly, the

object of the Treaty of the European Community of Defence, which was defeated when it had to be ratified. The fundamental functions of a government in a political union, which is to have the monopoly of the legitimate use of force, was not attributed to the community, as founded in the 1950s.

The adjective ‘political’ was added to the adjective ‘economic’ to qualify the noun in Maastricht (1991). On that occasion the noun became a ‘union’ instead of ‘community’. The idea was to move out of the field of economic matters and go into the fields of security, foreign policy, internal security. It was in a letter jointly signed by Mitterrand and Kohl in April 1990 that the message was sent to the other heads of State and Government that two, not one, intergovernmental conferences should be convened. One, to create an economic and monetary union and the single currency, the other to build a political union.

In conclusion, the two adjectives (economic, political) have, in a way, broad intersections. The *nature* of the process is political - irrespective of the object, which may be in the field of economics, or bioethics, or environmental protections. We are indeed in the field of politics whenever action is undertaken to organise the public space of life, in a city, or in a state, or in a group of states. The *object* itself, though, is said to be political *strictu sensu* when it pertains to the primary needs of any consociation of human beings, primary needs which are security and justice. To mark this double meaning of the word ‘political’ we should perhaps distinguish between two types of union: an economic-political one and a political-political one.

3. The second pair of adjectives I want to consider is *private* and *public*. If we were referring to the corresponding nouns, we would probably speak of markets and institutions.

The economic model underlying the Treaty of Rome is the model of a market economy, based on the idea that economic activity is fundamentally a private activity. The objective of the founding fathers was thus to create a

common market, to make Europe (starting with the six countries which took the initiative, but keeping the door open to any other European country adhering to the principles and rules of the Community) a single market economy.

The Treaty accepts that economic activity is driven by the pursuit of self-interests of firms and individuals. It is thus in line with the tradition of classical economic and political thinking. On the other hand, the Treaty undoubtedly embodies very strongly the idea that no market system can develop outside of, or without, a strong rule of law. So, there is a most important dimension, which is not private but public. Such dimension consists in providing the framework of legislation and law enforcement, without which the market is not order but anarchy. So, the adjectives 'private' and 'public' are the twin pillars of the edifice.

The stance taken by the Treaty of Rome is not as uncontroversial as it may seem today. If you look at the economic provisions of the Italian Constitution and compare them with the Treaty of Rome, you see that the approach is much less clear in the former than in the latter. The Italian Constitution was written in a moment in which the political forces that concurred to its stipulation had completely opposite views about the kind of economic order that was desirable for the country. The result has been a text fully compatible with the establishment of a Soviet type of economy. At the time the Constitution was written, there was a fundamental ambiguity as to which economic system should be allowed for. So, you can find articles stating that economic initiative is free, but also articles, in which the legitimacy of private property is made conditional to its social usefulness. Property rights are not seen as part of the set of fundamental rights, rights which need discipline but do not need to be justified by certain conditions. Instead, you do find this conditionality in the Italian constitution.

The Treaty of Rome is very different. It recognises the nature of the private economy in a much stronger fashion, and hence, I think, it also closes or resolves some of the ambiguities of the Italian Constitution.

In the meantime the Treaty of Rome does not exclude public ownership or nationalisations. As recently as in 1981, France, when Mitterrand became president and the left, including the Communist party, won a very large majority, adopted a vast program of nationalisation. All the banks, including the smallest ones, became state owned and the same happened to a number of other industrial sectors.

At first sight, the Treaty of Rome looks agnostic on whether property should be private or public. It only contains, however, a little, but crucial provision which I paraphrase here: the provision says that public ownership of enterprises is permitted provided publicly owned enterprises operate in a way that complies with the Treaty. And since the Treaty is based on principles of competition and an open market, this crucial provision basically obliges nationalised industries to comply with market principles, which are, in turn, based on the pursuit of self-interest under the rule of law. In other words, as the history of the 1980s shows, by forbidding to manage publicly owned enterprises with other criteria than the market criteria, the Treaty makes the substance of public ownership almost void.

In Italy, the process of privatisation was triggered by a tightening in the enforcement of European competition rules. When the European Commission adopted a more rigorous interpretation of such rules, the possibility to cover losses incurred by publicly owned enterprises was blocked under grounds that this granted to those enterprises unfair advantages in the form of state aids. This virtually obliged Italian publicly owned enterprises (in the steel sector and other branches of industry) to become profitable, or at least to break even. It seems a paradox that this, in the end, made public ownership of those enterprises no longer interesting, and they were largely privatised. Indeed the losses were often the result of managerial decisions driven by political objectives, rather than the objective to make a profit in the market. Of course, if the publicly owned firm makes large profits it may also be attractive for the state to own it, to catch the profits. However, while this may have been the case in previous

periods of Italian economic history, it was not the case since the mid 1970s, when publicly owned enterprises had lost the ability to generate profits.

The new approach to competition policy was gradually extended to public utilities, which for a very long time had been, almost *par excellence*, publicly owned sectors.

In conclusion, the Treaty is neutral as to ownership, whether public or private, but it is not neutral on market principles, and does not accept that the fundamental economic logic that organises economic life in an open market can be different depending on the structure of ownership.

4. There is another aspect in which the private-public pair of words is relevant. The notion underlying the Treaty is that the geographical span of the rule of law must coincide with that of the market. Investment, production and consumption decisions should be optimised *in the same space* in which legislation and law enforcement apply. It is not an exaggeration to say that the whole Treaty of Rome is based on this very idea. In order to have a common market, legislative and judiciary capacity are needed. In other words, it is necessary to recreate, at the level of the European Community, the same public economic functions that today exist at the level of a nation state.

The features of the public-private nexus I have just described mark a fundamental difference between the global and the European process of internationalisation of the market. Many of the issues arising today from the emergence of the global economy have been encountered by Europe, much earlier and on a regional scale. They were resolved in a radical way by the Treaty of Rome.

It is often observed that there is a global market but no global governance or capacity to establish the rules for that market and that, therefore, globalisation is a lopsided process, which has a strong private leg, but lacks a public policy or public power leg. The need to balance the private with the public dimension of the economy was consciously addressed by the founders of the EEC, who laid the foundation of the strong

institutional edifice necessary to permit the orderly implementation of a very 'privately' conceived economic order, the order of the market.

A most concise way to describe the objective of creating a common market is to see it as the establishment of the freedom of circulation of goods, services, capital and persons, the so-called four freedoms. It is worth noting here that the four freedoms were not entirely in place *within* the countries that agreed to implement them *among* themselves at the time of the stipulation of the Treaty of Rome. In Italy, for example, until late into the 1980s a bank was not allowed to lend outside the province where it was operating, which means that there was no complete freedom to provide services without internal frontiers within Italy.

This was also for the movement of persons. When the big wave of migrations from the South to the North of Italy took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s, municipalities still had a right to refuse an Italian fellow citizen to establish formal residence in the city. Of course, one could live in that city, have a job, rent an apartment, but not vote at the election for the city mayor or administration. In cities in the North of Italy, there were social attitudes and even organised movements, which were very hostile to the migrants from the South, not much less hostile than they are now to extra-communitarian migrants.

Much has changed in a few decades. When I was looking for a person to clean my house in Frankfurt, a Portuguese woman came to see me. She was accompanied by her husband, who was negotiating with me, while she remained silent. At some point, to be sure that everything was in order, I asked if she had the permit to reside and work in Frankfurt. The man was almost offended by my question. 'What do you mean, he said, I am European, I have my rights here!' The self awareness of a Portuguese to be in *his* territory when living in Frankfurt was much stronger than the awareness of a Sicilian to be in his territory in a Northern Italian town, forty years before, when the Treaty of Rome was written. So, deciding to establish the four freedoms across the countries of Europe meant to set an objective, which was going beyond what had been achieved within the

countries in a century, and even more, since the establishment of the nation state.

5. The next string of words in my little lexicon is *international, national, European, domestic*. In the history and jargon of European integration, the only one of these words that appears as an adjective qualifying nouns, is 'European'. However, I have chosen the full string of four words because I think - and what I just said illustrates the point - that it says much about the whole process of implementing the treaties from the 1950s until today. Indeed, the process consists in moving from organising intra-European relationships according to a model of international relations to the model of national or, I should say, domestic relations. In the German language, when one speaks of the domestic economy, one speaks of *Nationalökonomie*, the national economy. In English this is the domestic economy.

I referred to the establishment of four freedoms in the EU. The objective consisted in establishing, among the six founding countries, a group which gradually enlarged to twenty five, the type of economic order that is typical of a domestic economy. The chosen model was not taken from international trade or international relations. It was taken from the economic arrangements, which normally exist inside a state. It was so strongly conceived in this way, that practically the whole body of legislation concerning the economic activity was rewritten in Brussels, to make sure that it would apply it in a uniform way to the whole area of the single market of the European Community, of the European Union.

What I just noted is particularly striking in the monetary field. If you read the Treaty of Rome, you don't find much about money. The reason is that when the Treaty was written, Europe did have, albeit in a peculiar way, a single currency, which was the dollar. There was a system of fixed exchange rates *vis-à-vis* the dollar, which provided a strong monetary order consistent with the needs of a single market. This order lasted for about the first fifteen years, since 1958. It was a typical international arrangements,

not national, not domestic, not European. Europe was just part of a larger universe, and it was so not as a single entity (actually this is still not quite the case today), but through each of its nation states.

When that system broke down, it was replaced by a very similar arrangement, which was, however, regional rather than global, with the Deutsche Mark replacing the dollar. This too was a typical international arrangement, leaving in place national currencies and national monetary policies and just linking exchange rates. It lasted for twenty five years, from 1973 to 1998. Finally, the third step came, which was the introduction of a single currency.

What we see in the monetary field is thus a progressive move from an international to the domestic type of monetary constitution, consisting of a single currency and a single central bank. At the end of the process, the model of a domestic system, of a state, of a national system replaced the original model, which was an international one, in which the links were the exchange rates. The exchange rates between European currencies disappeared from the screens on the 4th of January 1999. The names of the national currencies remained for another three years, but just as names.

The word 'European' thus gradually shifted from referring to something international to something domestic. Note that here I don't say 'national', as the word national is used in different senses, depending on history and geography. Many of those, who advocate the construction of a united Europe refer to the creation of the American Federation in the late 18th century as a model to follow. It is interesting to note, however, that the Philadelphia Convention or the Founding fathers of the United States did not intend to *surpass* the nation by creating a federal power above the states. On the contrary they intended to *create* a nation. In the United States, when you say 'the nation' you mean the US federation. In Europe, 'the nation' today means each of the member states.

This is true today, but it was not so yesterday. In Italy, about two hundred years ago 'nations' were the cities or regions of origin, not the whole peninsula. Today, instead, 'nation' means Italy, not Tuscany, or

Siena, or Romagna, or Calabria. So, who knows what the word nation, which in the end means where you are born, will mean one day? For a country like Italy, the state was created to correspond to a nation, which preexisted. In the United States, the states were united to create a nation, which did not exist.

There are, thus, very different ways of looking at these words and concepts. But, in my view, the interesting element of the process of the European union as an act of getting united, is that in this process, what was external has gradually become internal. What was initially designed according to the model of international relations, progressively became designed according to the model of domestic relations.

6. I now go through the last string of words: *supranational*, *intergovernmental*, *federal*, *communitarian*. This is the string of words where dissimulation probably reaches the highest level.

Let me start with 'federal'. Of the four words - supranational, intergovernmental, federal, communitarian - 'federal' is probably the one, which has spurred the most heated controversies. This is exemplified by the fierce debate, in the negotiation of the Treaty of Maastricht, on how to qualify the Union.

As you are aware, the word 'union' was adopted to give a name to the overall construction, which was built in Maastricht. And, as you know, the name of the economic pillar of the overall Maastricht construction is still European Economic Community. The second and the third pillar refer to foreign and security policy and to justice and internal security. The three pillars together form the Union.

The question was: what adjective should accompany the word Union? The proposal to use 'federal' as the qualifying adjective became extremely controversial. The opponents to any significant transfer of sovereignty refused the word federal. The most pugnacious advocate of the refusal was the British Government. In the British political discourse 'federal' is in our days the devil, but 'federal' had been demonised in France earlier on, in the

1960s, under de Gaulle. It had been made synonymous of European super-state, of an extreme centralisation of power in Brussels.

In essence 'federal' came to indicate the opposite of what it truly means. In the writings of political philosophers, federalism is a doctrine derived from the idea of a minimal government and implies a transfer of powers from lower to higher levels of government as limited as possible. It fundamentally states that government should *not* be organised in a centralised Jacobin fashion, but, on the contrary, be structured through different levels of government, with the upper levels only taking up functions that cannot be performed adequately at lower levels. Indeed, federalism is almost a corollary of a free society, in which all the powers are with the individual, and from the level of the individual slowly move to upper decision making levels. This upward movement should be kept as minimal as possible in order not to limit the freedom of individuals, of small communities, regions, states.

Those who were against *any* transfer of power whatsoever, who were determined to prolong the dream of absolute national sovereignty, i.e. of a constitutional system in which the nation state did not recognise any authority above itself, those thinkers and politicians created a straw man. They pretended that the advocates of united Europe, the federalist, were pleading for the creation of a centralised European state, that they were the followers of Robespierre, not Madison. It was indeed much easier to insult a caricature than the true face.

What was the result of this struggle about words? Ironically, the result was that instead of having the word 'federal' the anti-federalist fought with success to qualify the Union, in the Treaty, as 'an ever closer union'! As it happens, people in a state of panic often run towards the peril rather than away from it. Every sensible person with some basic knowledge about political systems would put Robespierre behind the words 'ever closer' and Madison behind the word 'federal'.

7. Let me now turn to *supranational* and *intergovernmental*, two words that are often used to contrast two opposite models of Europe. In my view there is only one criterion to establish the difference between supranational and intergovernmental. This criterion is the same that tells the difference between being and not being united. This single criterion, the bottom line of this single criterion, is whether unanimity or majority is the rule in the decision making.

There is a union only when there is an agreement to stay united also when views and preferences differ as to how to manage the common affairs, as to what should be done in a particular instance. When the components act together only if they agree unanimously on what the action should be, there is no union, but just an occasional coincidence of wants, or a temporary alliance.

Let me give you a telling example. We have a monetary union because we meet in Frankfurt every month and we decide - *whether or not we all agree* - to change the rates or to keep them unchanged. If we had an 'intergovernmental' monetary union, we would still meet in Frankfurt and discuss whether the rates should be moved or not. But then, if we agreed, we would do what we have agreed upon, if we disagreed, each governor would go back home and move *his* rates the way he wants. When I describe this as an alternative type of monetary union people laugh, and rightly so. It is obvious that if we worked in the intergovernmental mode I just described, we could not have a single currency, we would not have structured all the aspects of the monetary system in the way we did. If we worked in the intergovernmental mode, one month we would have exchange rates between the Italian Euro and the German Euro, the next month we would no longer have them, because the rates would again be the same. This would not be a monetary union. Exactly the same is true for any other aspect. Indeed, an intergovernmental monetary union is a contradiction in terms.

Take the archetypal community, which is the condominium. For the edifice to be maintained in good shape the owners of the apartments must

act as a union. But for this to be the case, it is not enough to recognise in principle that the roof of the house is a common good, which has to be repaired when rain-water comes in. It is also necessary to have the ability to decide and the resources to implement the decision. If the repair cannot be decided unless everyone agrees on, say, the type of tile to put on the roof, or the colour of the tiles, then the roof will remain damaged. Similarly, it will remain damaged, and the house will inexorably decay, if the decision on the repair is taken, but resources are not provided to execute it.

‘Intergovernmental’ goes with the unanimity rule, ‘supranational’ with the majority rule.

Of course, there are many ways to implement the majority principle. For instance, when the Convention was operating, it was accepted - and this, in my view, was almost a fatal step - that it would decide by consensus. Giscard d’Estaing said the consensus would be the rule in the Convention. In the Convention there was a vast federalist majority, which wanted a significant increase in the degree of supranationalism. For example, when votes were taken, an overwhelming majority spoke in support of a common defence. However, when Giscard was reminded of that he said ‘Oh yes, but my notion of consensus is different’. He counted votes by institutions or national groups within the Parliament, not by persons. For him the Convention was an assembly of ‘orders’, not one of individuals. He treated the Convention in the same way in which the French *États Généraux* were treated before they made the revolutionary move from voting by orders to voting by heads. In America, the first decision of the Philadelphia Convention was to vote, and to vote by heads, not by State delegations. In America the founding act of the Constitution was the adoption of a rule of the procedure within the Convention itself.

Why is the majority principle so fundamental? Because in all human associations, in all fields, there is a union if and only if the members accept to stay together even when, for some of them, the way to pursue the common interest is not what they consider the best. They don’t want to remake the roof in tiles of baked clay, they prefer stones, but in order to

stop the rain pouring in, they accept to have it in clay, if this is what the majority wants. If you don't have this disposition, if this recognition of the common interest is lacking, there is no union. There may be occasional agreements, temporary alliances, but no union.

Consensus is not exactly the same thing as unanimity, it allows for a degree of disagreement, it may be a first step towards a stronger and more formalised affirmation of the majority principle. The essential point, however, what really makes the difference, is whether or not the members accept to stay and act together even when they disagree on what the best course of action is.

8. I conclude this lecture with a remark on the nature of the European union. It is to be noted that this nature is twofold, just as the meaning of the word 'union'. Europe is in the *state* of being united and in the *act* of getting united. Insofar as it is in the former, it is supranational. Insofar as it is in the latter, it is intergovernmental. Why such doubleness? There are, I think, two reasons. First, the EU is a compromise between partisans of a supranational model and partisans of an intergovernmental model. Second, the 'state' is supranational while the 'act' is intergovernmental; in other words, the process whereby the union is constructed requires, like all stipulations of international treaties, an agreement of all participants. Of these two reasons, the first has to do with ambiguity, the second with gradualism.

The genius of the founders, of Jean Monnet in particular, was to combine the two opposite elements, the supranational and the intergovernmental. It was this combination what permitted to gain enough support for partial transfers of sovereignty in a historical phase in which there would have never been support for the outright creation of a full fledged federal state as the Philadelphia Convention did. The dynamics of getting united has worked, at least until Maastricht, thanks to the combination of the two elements.

In the debate that developed in 2002 on Europe and the United States great attention was devoted to a book by Kagan comparing the US Hobbesian notion of the world and the European Kantian notion. Well, one could say, and this is in my view also the objection one can make to Kagan's book, you may wish to build a Kantian world and be bound to use Hobbesian means. It may indeed be impossible to build a Kantian world with Kantian means.

The supranational component of the Union was built with the intergovernmental method, typically conferences of diplomats, ministers, or government officials, where decisions require unanimity. So, the initial act was a unanimous consent to renounce unanimity on certain matters, which thenceforth became a competence of the union.

I don't think that the preference for a minimal union, for a minimal transfer of sovereignty, should be ultimately pursued through the preservation of a strong intergovernmental component. It should be pursued through a constitutional design, which provides for minimalism in the transfer of *functions* to the upper levels of government, not for minimalism in the *effectiveness* with which the functions are exerted. It is in my view very regrettable that, in the minds of many, the real guarantee should lie in the preservation of unanimity. Regrettable because a union that is only nominal, purely virtual, is not only ineffective, it also discredits the very notion of being united.

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