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Anti-Americanism in Europe during the Cold War¹

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Anti-Americanism deserves the label of an “essentially contested concept.” Any attempt to define anti-Americanism is an exploration of how a recurrent set of themes, some of them going back to the American Revolution,² have been played out over and over in different tunes and rhythms. This makes it extremely difficult to precisely pinpoint its nature and characteristics. Part of the persistence of anti-Americanism is explained by its very contentious nature, its being as much a description of a set of phenomena as a normative instrument, either “for mobilizing popular support and deflecting frustration away from the leadership toward a foreign, omnipresent and supposedly omnipotent protagonist,”³ or, more frequently in Western Europe, for delegitimizing political opponents’ credentials. In this connection, anti-Americanism has always played an important political function in the ideological clash between left and right, both in Europe⁴ and in the United States.⁵ I do not intend to offer here another reconstruction of this flow of images, an endeavor typically carried on at the national level – on countries such as France,⁶ Germany,⁷ Italy,⁸ or the Netherlands⁹ – and only more rarely in a comparative fashion.¹⁰ My story is sliced in a slightly different way.

In this paper, I will focus on the image of the United States entertained at the mass level in the Cold War period. My analysis is limited to Western European forms of anti-Americanism – considered by some¹¹ to be less mercurial and resentful than those in the Third World. In particular, I focus my attention on France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, not only because of their different national cultures and the rich set of long-term survey data available, but also because, quite interestingly, each has alternatively been singled out by some authors as the most anti-American country in Europe. My analysis is also focused on a period – the Cold War era between 1950 and 1970 – never systematically covered by the empirical analyses

of mass anti-Americanism usually concerned with more recent periods such as the 1980s or the post-Cold War era. The paper is based on a secondary analysis of a very rich, differentiated, and so far underutilized stock of remarkably systematic surveys collected between the '50s and the '80s by several institutions, among which the United States Information Agency (USIA) and Eurobarometer are most prominent. Of course, secondary analysis (and mine is no exception) is severely constrained by the kind of questions others have asked for their own purposes. In trying to turn this liability into an asset, I chose to move across surveys carried out in different periods so as to exploit the variety of indicators available, at the expense of some of the rigor offered by the strict comparability over time of identically worded questions.

Accordingly, my paper is organized into three main sections. In the first section, I will discuss the nature of anti-Americanism and its main indicators. I will demonstrate that anti-Americanism is a multidimensional construct reflecting feelings, beliefs, and policy attitudes. That is, it contains both emotional and cognitive elements. The second section describes the evolution of anti-Americanism in Europe over more than fifty years, examining whether and to what extent anti-Americanism is a moody, erratic phenomenon, or, alternatively, can be explained by the evolution of the international situation. In line with the revisionist view of public opinion in the aggregate,¹² the data show that, at this level, anti-Americanism in Europe moves in line with the policies of the United States. The third section focuses intensively on the period between 1952 and 1970, when views of America fluctuated considerably. My analysis of the data from this period casts doubt on the usual assumption that European anti-Americanism is an elite phenomenon. It also demonstrates interesting

interactions between such variables as Left-Right differences, anti-Sovietism, and nationality, on the one hand, and anti-Americanism on the other.

How Europeans Think about America

The definitions of anti-Americanism offered by the literature¹³ run the full gamut of the predispositional-situational continuum. The stereotypical view of anti-Americanism – the prevalent declination of anti-Americanism in cultural studies¹⁴ – defines it as visceral and emotional, a knee-jerk reaction to anything American, rooted in personality traits similar to ethnocentrism and anti-Semitism (to which some claim it is related). The cognitive view – prevalent in studies based on survey data¹⁵ – sees anti-Americanism as a reaction, situationally grounded, to American foreign policies and actions. In between, there are those who characterize anti-Americanism as an “ambivalent” sentiment in which a set of different considerations are “sampled” and averaged in people’s minds.¹⁶

In my attempt to offer an operational definition of anti-Americanism, I think it useful to start from the more general and neutral concept of “image,” defined as “the organized representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive system.”¹⁷ An image of a nation “constitutes the totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation.”¹⁸ As such, it is a “combinatorial construct”¹⁹ of three interrelated components: (a) cognitive, the set of attributes that the person understands as “inherent” to the object; (b) affective, representing like or dislike of the focal object; and (c) conative, “... consisting of a set of responses to the object that the person deems appropriate in the light of its perceived attributes.”²⁰ This

tripartite distinction, analogous to and inspired by the threefold dimensions of attitude prevalent in the psychological literature,²¹ is helpful in disentangling three fundamentally different sets of attitudes regarding the United States: feelings, beliefs, and policy attitudes. People can hold affective or emotional feelings toward the United States. People can also entertain certain beliefs about what the United States is. The American system has been acclaimed or assailed for several reasons, such as its capitalistic nature, its democratic mission, and its being a “beacon of modernity.” Finally, given the powerful position held by the United States in the world system, people tend to evaluate American policies and actions on their own merits, possibly on a standard quite distinct from their beliefs and feelings toward the political object. Feelings, beliefs, and attitudes can vary quite independently among them.

Here, I interpret anti-Americanism as a general mood of like-dislike toward America rather than negative beliefs about one or another attribute of the American political, cultural, or socio-economic system, or negative attitudes toward one or another American policy, decision or behavior.²² I therefore define anti-Americanism as the psychological tendency to systematically modulate in a negative way the assessment of the United States. Anti-Americanism is a form of “mood” whose main function is to act as “a primary mechanism for altering information-processing priorities and for shifting modes of information processing.”²³ In other words, anti-Americanism is the “affective background” that permeates our assessment of what the U.S. does and is. Such a definition leaves open to empirical assessment the issue of whether its sources are rational or irrational, “visceral” or thoughtful. Before examining the affective nature of anti-Americanism and its relationship to the

cognitive components in shaping attitudes toward the United States, I will briefly introduce the main indicators used to measure it in the empirical literature.

Indicators of anti-Americanism

To measure anti-American feelings at the mass level, three sets of indicators have traditionally been used.²⁴ A first set of questions asks respondents' feelings or opinions about the United States. These questions come in two formats. The most frequent is a standard Likert-scale question, asking the respondent's opinion on the U.S. on a scale ranging from very good to very bad,²⁵ with an intermediate "fair" (or, alternatively, neither good nor bad)²⁶ category. An alternative method is the so-called "feeling thermometer."²⁷ A second set of questions, also asked repeatedly over time, elicits the level of trust in the American people.²⁸ The third and probably the most straightforward way of measuring anti-American feelings was tried in Eurobarometer 17 (April 1982) and 22 (April 1984): "How would you describe your feelings toward the United States. As strongly anti-American, somewhat anti-American, somewhat pro-American, strongly pro-American or neither pro- nor anti-American (only volunteered)."

There are two crucial differences in the questions' content, whose impact on the aggregate level of negative orientation toward the United States I will briefly discuss here: the nature of the sentiments invoked (either feelings, opinion, or trust) and the referent object (either the United States or the American people). As to the consequences of these differences in wording, the available evidence shows four outcomes. First, respondents are indeed able to distinguish between the people of a nation and their governments, when explicitly invited to do so, and they are more than

ready to blame the latter rather than the former when evaluating policies – even in situations such as war, where such a distinction is less obvious and less expected. This was true of American opinions toward the Germans before and during²⁹ the Second World War³⁰ and toward Iraqis in the first Gulf war,³¹ as well as of British opinions after the Second World War.³²

Second, the willingness to distinguish between people and their government is sharper where political relations between one's own country and the U.S. are strained.³³ In 1948, Buchanan and Cantril (1953) reported that in nine Western countries surveyed (among them the four considered here), “the word «government» and «people» ... have been found to be almost synonymous.”³⁴ In 2002, when the U.S. image was more tarnished, among the forty-four countries surveyed by PEW, some differences did arise between the overall feelings toward the United States and toward the American people in those countries where relationships with U.S. were tenser. Among Western European countries, favorability toward Americans is seven points higher than toward the United States; in the three Middle Eastern countries surveyed (Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon), it is even more discrepant (sixteen points difference). In sharp contrast, no significant difference between people and country is found among Latin American and African respondents.

Third, a generic reference to the United States seems more likely to evoke the country rather than the American people in the respondent's mind. The fact that people are able to distinguish between governments and their subjects when explicitly invited to do so does not tell us whether they will always do so when this distinction is not explicitly offered in the question or, furthermore, what is in their minds when the only reference is “the United States.” Such a reference has been criticized as

ambiguous because "... it does not refer to an explicit set of national characteristics or attributes and therefore we have no way of knowing which symbols and associations serve as referents to the respondent prior to his expression of feeling."³⁵

On the other hand, as also remarked by Abravanel and Hughes, exactly because it is so cueless, the feeling question taps a general and basic attitude toward the referent object, an "anchoring dimension of people's images of the international environment"³⁶ that is hierarchically superior to beliefs and policy attitudes, through which the respondents filter their perceptions of the international environment. Table 1 sheds some light on the former point and Table 2 on the latter. Table 1 compares the differences found when asking for feelings toward either a "country" or its "people," holding constant other possible sources of variations, in our four countries in different periods.³⁷ In 1958, a split-half experiment was tried, in which half of the sample was asked to express its feelings toward the United States and the other half toward Americans. In 2002, both questions were asked to the same respondents, one after the other. In the 1958 USIA question, there is no difference in the two distributions; in the 2002 PEW question, there is only a slight difference, with respondents more likely to have a positive opinion of the people than of the nation. The slight difference between sympathy toward the U.S. and toward the American people in 2002 as compared to 1958 is, I suspect, due to different degrees of strain in political relationships between the respondent's own country and the United States in the two periods.³⁸

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Table 2 cross-tabulates the answers given in our four countries to two questions regarding favor toward the United States and toward Americans,

respectively. Eighty-five percent of those interviewed tended to either favor both or disfavor both. Among those who make a distinction, however, respondents were far more likely to like Americans and dislike the United States than vice versa. This table seems, therefore, to indicate that the U.S. feelings question taps a more general orientation toward the United States than the one asking about the American people.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Fourth, and finally, the different questions consistently produce similar results. In the Eurobarometer 17 of March-April 1982, three of the indicators of anti-Americanism discussed here were included in the same questionnaire. At the beginning, respondents were asked about their level of trust in Americans.³⁹ Then, in the middle of the questionnaire, their opinion toward the United States⁴⁰ and anti-American feelings were addressed.⁴¹ All three indicators are all highly intercorrelated (average inter-items correlation 0.576, all correlations significant at the 0.001 level). It is possible that the strength of the correlations was inflated by the fact that two of the items were asked in sequence. Still, the one question that was asked earlier, in a separate section of the questionnaire (the level of trust toward Americans), shows the highest correlation with the other two items.⁴²

These results corroborate the conclusions reached by Smith and Wertman⁴³ more than ten years ago: that the alternative ways of measuring overall opinion of the United States produce very similar results. This holds true over time and across countries. The question now becomes whether or not this general opinion toward the

United States – usually measured using a feeling question – is a valid indicator of anti-Americanism as I defined it above.⁴⁴

Anti-Americanism as a Vicarious Experience

In studying anti-Americanism, one should never forget that the majority of Europeans' experience of the United States and Americans is eminently vicarious and nationally framed. This is true in a twofold sense. First, very few Europeans have ever had a direct and continuous personal experience, in the U.S. or elsewhere, with Americans and their system. Only a slim minority (although an increasing one over time) in France, Germany, and Italy has ever traveled to the United States. In December 1937 (Gallup), only 8 percent of the British had “ever traveled to America.” In 1953, only 2 percent of the French had been to the United States;⁴⁵ according to a PEW survey,⁴⁶ 7 percent of Italians, 14 percent of French, and 29 percent of (West) Germans paid a visit to the U.S. in 2002. The United Kingdom has always been the exception here. Although in July 1942 only 6 percent of the British public reported having at least traveled to the U.S., 35 percent of those interviewed knew “Americans personally.” In 2002 (Pew), 40 percent of the British had “ever traveled to US.” Even fewer, presumably, are those who have lived in the U.S. for more than a short period for tourism or business.

Second, the image of the American way of life and politics is, for most Western Europeans, mediated and framed by national sources such as music, movies, sports, and, in countries like Italy, immigrants. The messages coming from the United States are not apprehended directly, in the same sense in which a fluently English speaking person appreciates a novel by Saul Bellow in the original language. On the

contrary, they are received through framing by opinion leaders, intellectuals, and an assorted set of pundits in each national culture. Their task is “translating,” not only literally but also metaphorically, the object in a different national context, making it understandable to people used to a different discourse-context. As a 1960 USIA survey shows, only 3 percent of the respondents in these four countries read American newspapers, and 7 percent read American magazines (in the UK this percentage doubled). Also radio, television (at that time still a dawning enterprise, with the exception of Great Britain, where 33 percent mentioned American TV programs), and books as sources of information on America were prevalently national. The only vehicle through which the American society is perceived in a somehow more direct way is the movie. In 1960, American movies were an important source of information for 26 percent of the public in these four countries (32 percent in Italy, the highest percentage of the four).

There is, however, an important difference between the European experience of the United States during the Cold War and their experience of other countries, for example the Soviet Union or China. America and Americans had a unique opportunity to be known in (Western) Europe in a more personal and direct way: the war and its immediate aftermath on the one hand, and the American military presence in several of these countries on the other. It might sound paradoxical to say that the war and the American occupation (and liberation) of much of Europe contributed to projecting, in a very concrete fashion, a positive image of the United States; but this is the impression one gets from the scattered data available on this matter, as we will see when I discuss the sources of America’s image during the Cold War in section III.

But once American troops progressively left the European countries, the physical presence of the U.S. government faded away, becoming less conspicuous (and also more contentious): the effects of the Marshall Plan remained only in the memories of those who benefited directly or indirectly from them, and the image of the United States was conveyed prevalently by mass media.

Beliefs about America and anti-Americanism during the Cold War

Given the indirect and vicarious nature of most Western Europeans' experience of America, the question immediately arises of the extent to which this image is grounded in reality. In this section, I will argue two seemingly contradictory points. The first is that, given how little the public is credited with knowing about politics, the image of the United States at the mass level is remarkably well rooted in empirical facts. The second point is that people's beliefs about the United States have a quite differentiated and, overall, modest impact on their general feelings toward the U.S.

To examine the role of mass public beliefs as a source of anti-Americanism, one has to assume a linkage between the attitude object (i.e., the United States), the relevant belief about that object, and the final evaluative judgment. First, people must be able to give meaning to specific political attributes such as democracy, capitalism, or socialism. Second, one has to attach a positive or negative evaluative judgment to each attribute. Third, people must be able to recognize that America is endowed with that specific attribute, for example, being capitalistic or democratic. Fourth, this bad (or good) judgment about the attribute has to bring about a more generally negative (or positive) sentiment about the United States. The issue here is not only that anti-

Americans see the U.S. as inherently, or strictly, associated with attributes they dislike – for example, being capitalistic or modern – but also that this critical evaluation generalizes into an overall anti-American mood that shapes other perceptions and bias information.

To reconstruct such a four-step movement at the mass level is not an easy task, considering that one must rely only on a scattered set of secondary data from the late 1950s and early 1960s that was not designed with this purpose in mind. In fact, the available data allow us to explore the role of only one set of beliefs, regarding capitalism. This is, however, an important test of whether, as stated by Hollander,⁴⁷ “Much of the criticism directed at American society is part of a general critique of capitalism of which the United States is not only the pre-eminent example but also the global defender.”⁴⁸

Let us first examine our four European countries’ public opinion of capitalism in the 1950s and early 1960s. The survey data show that negative feelings toward capitalism were quite widespread among the public in that period. Anti-capitalistic feelings were more likely to be found among the French public (40 and 48 percent, respectively, for 1956 and 1962), followed by the Italians (37 percent in 1962), British (32 percent in 1956 and 30 percent in 1962), and Germans (29 percent in 1962). Apparently, most of the mass public in these four countries preferred a combination of socialist and capitalist elements, with a plurality in all four preferring an economic system somewhere in between. Asked, in June 1962, to locate their preferred economic system on an 11-point scale ranging from a completely socialistic system to a completely capitalistic one,⁴⁹ 44 percent of the French, 36 percent of the British, 30 percent of the Italians, and 28 percent of the Germans positioned themselves exactly

in the median category.⁵⁰ The sympathy for socialism (more popular than capitalism among the European public)⁵¹ springs in part from the way the public happens to define it. Requested by USIA in June 1962 to choose between two different meanings of socialism – either ownership of “all the major industries,” or responsibility “for social welfare measures (like health and old age assistance and unemployment benefits)” – 68 percent of the sample in the four European countries chose the latter.

Second, assuming that most people have an idea of what they are talking about, are these people also able to locate the United States on a hypothetical scale from fully capitalist to completely socialist? A question in June 1962 invited the respondent to locate both her own national economic system and the American system on a socialist-capitalist continuum, ranging from completely socialistic to completely capitalistic. Table 3 reports where, on average, the respondents located their ideal economic system, their own national economic system, and the United States on a 1-11 scale.⁵² This table illustrates three points. First, as we just said, people prefer a system combining elements of both capitalism and socialism. Second, their own country’s economic system was always seen as more capitalistic than they would like. Third, and more important, the United States was located at the capitalist extreme of this continuum, with an average of ten points out of eleven, while their own country was located, on average, three steps below (and approximately 1.6 steps above their preferred mix). There is no doubt, then, that the United States was perceived as the truly capitalist system in the world – a perception shared by many experts and observers.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The ability of the mass public to accurately perceive a difference between the United States' economic system and their own is confirmed by the results of another question, asked by USIA in April, 1956. This question invited respondents to explicitly compare their own national economic systems with the American one. On average, no more than 9 percent of the public in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom answered that the two systems were "very similar," ranging from 13 percent of Germans to 12 percent of British to only 1 percent of French respondents. On this basis, one can conclude that the Europeans at that time were not only able to express their preferred economic system – a "mixed economy" – but also to locate the United States very close to what might be considered a purely capitalistic economic system.

The third and final step is then to establish whether this belief about American capitalism affects the public's evaluation of the United States. Is the capitalistic nature of the American economic system a reason to hold bad feelings toward it? Before examining this question in the context of different beliefs about America, let me show two pieces of evidence. The first is a quasi-experimental question from the USIA XX-14 survey of June 1962, where one half of the sample was given a question on their "opinion in general of the American economic system," while the other half was asked, "What is your opinion in general about capitalism in the US." Table 4 reports the distribution for the two versions, broken down by country. It shows that the reference to capitalism has a statistically significant negative impact on regard for the American economic system.⁵³ When the question asks for an opinion "in general on the American economic system," 63 percent of Germans, 38 percent of French, 37 percent of British, and 58 percent of Italian respondents offered a favorable one. If the

reference to “US Capitalism” is included, the percentage of favorable responses drops to 34 percent for Germans, 17 percent for French, 23 percent for British, and 35 percent for Italians. However, the major effect of priming capitalism in the question is to increase the number who chose the “neither” option, rather than those explicitly opposed. On average across the four countries, introducing a reference to capitalism increases the percentage of intermediate responses by eleven points, while increasing negative responses by only three points.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

These results do not yet imply that the negative impact of an explicit reference to capitalism translates into a generally negative affective orientation toward the United States. Both questions referred only to the American “economic system.” A second piece of evidence bears more directly on this latter point. Cross-tabulating attitudes toward capitalism (on a good-bad scale) with anti-Americanism (as measured by a feelings question, always on a good-bad scale) produces quite a clear relationship between the two variables, showing that attitudes toward capitalism had some impact on anti-American feelings in general. The number of pro-Americans declines from 79 to 58 percent, a drop of 19 points, when we move from those with a positive orientation toward capitalism to those with a negative one. However, again, this decline does not automatically increase the number of anti-Americans, but rather the number of those indifferent. The percentage of those with a “fair” feeling toward the U.S. increases from 18 to 32 percent as one goes from the pro- to the anti-capitalists, an increase of 14 percentage points, while anti-Americans (those with

negative feelings toward the U.S.) increase from 3 to 10 percent, a 7-point increase. These results seem to indicate that feelings toward America are generally positive even when, as in this case, orientation toward capitalism is negative. Although orientation toward capitalism is prevalently negative in all four countries, this does not necessarily make people anti-American; if anything, they become more tepid toward the United States.

Beliefs about America as a capitalist country are not the only relevant ones. The United States is also seen a symbol of modernity, a beacon of democracy, and a superpower whose foreign policy can be perceived either as arrogant and imperialistic or as progressive and forthcoming against external threats. Examining the role of economic considerations, together with other beliefs such as those about the democratic nature of the United States, its modernity, and its hegemonic role in the international system, allows us to shed some light on the possible nature of anti-Americanism and its determinants. A survey carried out in October 1958 (USIA XX-11, Form B) in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom allows such a comparative analysis of the impact of three sets of beliefs – economic, political, and cultural – on anti-Americanism.

To measure economic beliefs, I use two indicators. The first is a summative index of economic attitudes based on two items: whether it was true that “The US economic system does not benefit only a few but the most,” and whether “Their economic system brings regularly economic crises.”⁵⁴ The second is a question asking the respondent’s opinion toward “business” in the United States (on a 5-point scale ranging from very good to very bad, with an intermediate category), used as a proxy, although an imperfect one, of anti-capitalistic attitudes. As to political beliefs, two

questions were used. One taps attitudes toward the domestic political system, asking about the “political life” in the United States, again on a 5-point Likert scale. The other question asks the overall impression of U.S. foreign policy on a 4-point scale, ranging from very favorable to very unfavorable, with no intermediate category. To measure cultural beliefs, I asked the respondent’s “opinion of cultural life in [the US] – that is, art, music, literature and the like.” The answers ranged from 1 to 5 on a good-bad Likert-scale with an intermediate category.

In addition to this set of beliefs, I also include a measure of pro-Sovietism, since sympathy toward the Soviet Union has traditionally been considered a driving force behind anti-Americanism, especially in countries with strong communist parties like France and Italy. This question measuring opinions toward the Soviet Union allows us to test whether anti-Americanism was negatively related with pro-Sovietism. Gender, age (in classes), party preference (arranged on a Left-Center-Right continuum), and education (in three classes: Elementary, High School and University) are used as control variables. All of these measures were regressed on anti-Americanism, as measured by the feeling question. Table 5 reports the standardized regression coefficients of an OLS estimate.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

In looking at the results, two outcomes stand out. The first is that the sum of all these beliefs do not account for a higher proportion of variation in anti-Americanism. The quite low variance demonstrated by the model suggests that beliefs alone do not explain the variation in anti-Americanism; there exist other sources. The second

noteworthy feature is that these beliefs play a differentiated role in explaining anti-Americanism. All economic, social, cultural, and political beliefs have a significant impact in the expected direction. The relative weight of these beliefs on anti-Americanism, however, is different in the different countries. In 1958, cultural and foreign policy beliefs about America are preeminent. Political considerations, such as admiration for the American domestic political system, are also important, although less so than the other two sets of considerations. Economic considerations are much less important. The orientation toward business is not significant (with one exception I will discuss shortly), and the opinion of the U.S. economy, when compared to other predictors, dwindles. This is also partly due to the imperfect indicator of anti-capitalist beliefs I was compelled to use.

As we saw earlier, beliefs about the American economic system are sensitive to priming “capitalism” in the question. This means that this model probably underestimates the impact of the capitalistic orientation on anti-Americanism. With this limitation in mind, however, the model works comparatively well. Only the French national dummy remains significant, once all predictors are included. Looking at the national differences in detail,⁵⁵ one finds that the most important country-differences are the economic index in France and anti-Sovietism in Italy. In France, the index combining various beliefs about the economic nature of the American system is the most important predictor of anti-Americanism. In Italy, anti-Sovietism plays a greater role than in the other countries, ranking second in importance after attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy. In the other countries, this variable is not significant (although the sign is in the expected direction in two out of the three).

These results seem to support Smith and Wertman's claim⁵⁶ regarding the (lack of) attraction of the Soviet model.⁵⁷ The national analyses confirm what the general model tells us: In all countries, cultural beliefs stand out as significant (this coefficient is the most important in Germany and the second most important in the other three countries). General attitude toward U.S. foreign policy is also relevant in all countries, in relative terms (with the exception of France); in Italy and Great Britain, it is the most important predictor of anti-Americanism. In conclusion, of the several different beliefs about the United States, the cultural and political ones appear to be the major sources of anti-Americanism. Anti-capitalism, at least at the mass level, appears much less relevant, although this conclusion is still tentative pending a better way to measure this set of beliefs.

The Affective Dimension of anti-Americanism

As discussed at the beginning of this section, anti-Americanism is seen here as the affective or evaluative dimension of the image of the United States. I have now shown that this image is firmly grounded in beliefs about the American system, but also that cognitive beliefs have a fairly differentiated impact: alone, they are not able to explain the totality of anti-Americanism. The affective and cognitive components, although both concurring in shaping attitudes toward the United States, work in a partially independent way. In this section, I examine in more detail the affective nature of anti-American feelings. After a very brief review of different ways of measuring the affective component of attitudes, I will test, in a preliminary way, a "circumplex model" of anti-Americanism, as drawn from the work of Marcus et al.⁵⁸ on the role of emotion in politics.

In the last decade, political science has thoroughly reevaluated the role of affect and emotion, both theoretically and methodologically. Although the “primacy of affect in generating the particular contents of image” was already acknowledged in the ‘50s,⁵⁹ only in the ‘80s was the role of feelings in shaping our evaluations of political figures set at the center stage of research. With it, the role of passions in politics has been reevaluated.⁶⁰ In this section, I intend neither to enter into a discussion of the role of feelings and affect in politics, nor to take a stand on the relationship between cognition and affect in shaping attitudes.⁶¹ My task is simpler and more preliminary: to evaluate the dimensional nature of anti-Americanism as an affective state. The structure of affect that usually underlies the concept of anti-Americanism is typically assumed to be unidimensional, with respondents locating themselves on a continuum ranging from negative to positive. All indicators of anti-Americanism discussed so far assume this structure. Recent developments in the study of emotion⁶² posit a more complex dimensionality. Two competing structures have been suggested. The first assumes a “discrete” structure of emotions, in which different fundamental emotions are aroused depending on the context and the motivations. A second structural model, which Marcus calls “circumplex,”⁶³ posits a fundamentally bidimensional structure of emotions, rooted in a different neuro-psychological structure. A first dimension, called “mastery,” is characterized by positive emotionality, while the second, called “threat,” “monitors the environment for signs of evident danger.”⁶⁴

To explore the dimensional nature of affective orientation toward anti-Americanism, seen as an emotional assessment of America, I will refer to a survey carried out in August 1955 in the four countries examined here, in which respondents

were asked which of a list of words best described the United States for them. Table 6 reports the percentage of respondents choosing each adjective in 1955 and 1961 in our four countries (with the exception of Italy in 1961).

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

In all four countries, with different national patterns, positive terms were more likely to be chosen than negative ones. Adjectives such as democratic, cooperative, and peace-loving were most often associated with the United States. The most frequently mentioned negative word was “materialistic,” chosen by 39 percent of French and 30 percent of German respondents. To explore the dimensional nature of the structure of emotional arousal of anti-Americanism, a factor analysis of these items was carried out. As seen in Figure 1, three fundamental dimensions emerge from this exploratory analysis.⁶⁵ One dimension, with the highest eigenvalue, clusters those words that can be described as “positive.” The second dimension captures the “negative” image of the United States, while the third factor is probably a consequence of the imperfect measurement of the variables and therefore due to error. These results challenge the prevalent assumption of anti-Americanism as a simple, undimensional, evaluative dimension, suggesting that people can entertain both positive and negative affect toward the same object.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

To further explore the dimensional nature of anti-Americanism, I carried out a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the 1955 data, postulating a two-dimensional model of emotions. I assumed that the underlying structure of anti-Americanism consists of two dimensions, one positive and the other negative. The CFA allows us to evaluate the fit of our model with the data. The nine words describing America are used as indicators of the two latent structures, to which we add the feeling indicator as a synthetic measure of anti-Americanism. My intent here is to see whether overall feeling toward the United States is driven by this bi-dimensional emotional structure. The first dimension – the “mastery” or positive one – is defined by the indicators Peace-loving, Cultured, Trustworthy, Democratic, and Religious. The second dimension – the “threat” or negative one – is construed by the indicators Aggressive, Imperialistic, Materialistic, Immature, Domineering, and Reckless. The feeling opinion is measured by the 5-point Likert scale. With the exception of the feeling question, all variables are dichotomous.

The two-dimensional model fits the data. This analysis shows that general anti-Americanism feelings, typically measured by the simple unidimensional traditional Likert-scale indicator, are actually accounted for by two independent dimensions, one referring to a positive orientation toward the United States and the other to a negative one. The positive sign between the two latent factors seems to corroborate the hypothesis that the overall image can be thought of as comprising both positive and negative judgments about a political object. As such, the general feelings indicator is a combination of the two factors, with the positive surpassing the negative in determining overall sentiment toward the United States.

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

As I will show in the next section, this bidimensional nature can help us to explain the fluctuating nature of anti-Americanism, clarifying under which conditions anti-Americanism is likely to be activated. When the perceived threat from the environment becomes salient enough, this dimension will become more salient. Conversely, when the scanned environment does not produce ominous signs, the “mastery” dimension is more relevant, as was the case in 1955.

Cycles of Anti-American Mood during the Cold War

There are two reasons why a long-term perspective is particularly useful to studying the determinants of anti-Americanism as defined here. The first is that if anti-Americanism is driven, as shown in the previous section, as much by U.S. foreign policy as by beliefs about the American system, only an analysis of the impact of events on general attitudes can help to capture this dynamic. Second, in light of the intense debate about the resurgence and intensity of contemporary anti-Americanism nowadays, only a long-term analysis allows us to assess the degree to which the present period differs from previous ones. Figure 3 shows, for our four countries, the evolution of net general feelings toward the U.S. between 1948 and 2004, obtained by subtracting those with a negative opinion from those with a favorable one.

The figure points to three main results. First, in all four countries, sentiments toward the United States have been prevalently positive over time. This long-term view confirms once again what other authors have stressed: that “anti-Americanism

has been the view of only a limited minority in most Western European countries throughout the postwar period....”⁶⁶ Second, although substantially positive, the aggregate level of anti-American sentiment varies across countries. The French public is systematically more anti-American in its orientation, while the German and Italian publics are less so than the overall average. Great Britain locates itself in the middle. The net average feeling toward the U.S. in the period 1952-2004 is 20 points for France; 50 and 48 for Germany and Italy, respectively; and a slightly lower 43 points for Britain. This confirms the popular image of the French public as generally less pro-American than the other European countries. Third, the figure reports some fluctuations over time in the net level of anti-Americanism.

[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

To give a clearer view of these fluctuations, I smoothed the four trend lines, using a procedure Stimson⁶⁷ applied to develop his measure of mood.⁶⁸ To plot and evaluate the general movement of anti-Americanism over time, differences among countries can be ignored. In fact, the four series move quite in parallel, with an average correlation between pairs of 0.617, with only the British-French pair less than 0.5 (at 0.377), and only Italy-Germany more than 0.8 (at 0.865). Forced to vary around the same average and range of variation, the series flattens a bit and shows the starker picture in Figure 4.

[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

This figure gives us a fourth piece of information: The fluctuating nature of anti-Americanism after the Second World War shows no clear trend either upward or downward. Contrary to a widespread conviction, over the long term, anti-Americanism is not on the rise. Instead, the data indicates that anti-American mood cycles around the (definitely positive) mean. We have waves of anti-Americanism, with some fluctuations whose amplitude, interestingly enough, increases over time. Each downward movement is very quickly followed by a reversal of the trend line toward the mean.

Furthermore, these fluctuations, as measured by the net favorability indicator, seem related to shifts in the international political environment. The increases in anti-Americanism (as measured by dips in net favor) all seem related to crises in transatlantic relations. The first spike recorded by the available data is in October 1954, due exclusively to the French data point, following the failure to ratify the EDC (European Defense Community) by the French National Assembly. A second upturn, in the second half of the 1950s, is brought about the Suez crisis and lasts until November 1957, as reported from the available survey data. The 1960s are a period of steadily declining anti-Americanism, as shown by the net favor. The third surge in anti-Americanism materializes between 1971 and 1976, a likely consequence of the controversies over the Vietnam War, the monetary crisis over the termination of dollar convertibility, and the economic drift brought about by the Arab oil embargo. The next display of anti-Americanism manifested itself in the early 1980s, in connection with the collapse of détente, the controversial NATO Euromissiles decision, and the acrimonious debate over Reagan's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union.

Things started to improve again in 1985, with the arrival of Gorbachev and his policy changes. The first post-Cold War spike in anti-Americanism occurs in 1994-5, but should be interpreted with caution, since it is based only on the Italian data point. It probably occurred due to the U.S. reluctance to become embroiled in the turmoil of the Balkans and the uncertainty over American willingness to intervene there in support of European troops on the ground. The deepest crisis, since survey data have been available and as far as anti-Americanism is concerned, takes place in 2003. In that year, net favor in these four countries not only reaches its lowest level, but for the first time becomes negative (i.e., more negative opinions than positive) in Germany and Italy, and reaches its lowest point (+8) in Great Britain. However, as in the past,⁶⁹ sympathy toward the United States is quick to recover. By July 2003, positive feelings in France outmatch the negative at 29 percent. This upswing in positive feeling is characteristic of attitudes toward the United States for the entire fifty-year period.

Figure 4 also emphasizes a second dynamic in the trend of anti-Americanism. Although fluctuations are characteristic of anti-American sentiments, their range of variation becomes wider and wider over time. In other words, anti-American sentiments remain a minority view, but they are also less and less stable as time goes on. The end of the Cold War, in particular (although this trend seems to start earlier on, in the early 80s), makes it easier to express anti-American feelings, as international events put the United States at odds with their European partners.

Having ascertained the general pattern of anti-Americanism over time, I now move to exploring the possible sources of anti-Americanism in the period of the Cold War between the early 1950s and 1970.

Sources of Anti-Americanism during the Cold War: 1952-1970

The Second World War and the Cold War that quickly ensued in Europe as well as elsewhere in the world contributed to frame a new, powerful, and benign image of the United States and its role in the foreign policy of the Western European countries. This image was largely built by national European elites for their own domestic purposes, taking into account the realities and constraints of the external environment. I will argue here that the way the image of the United States was created for the public after the Second World War – largely by and through elite discourse – was shaped by several forces, among them the “shared experiences” of the war and the domestic exigencies of political elites. In turn, this image, once created, persisted over time, producing a “path-dependent” set of beliefs and attitudes about the United States.⁷⁰ An image, created in a certain period, persists over time until a series of events or policy changes slowly produces a change in it. In this connection, one might point to the 1970s (with the Vietnam War and Watergate) or the 1990s (with the end of the Cold War and the creation of a Euro polity) as possible critical junctures for changes in the U.S. image.

In order to understand the role the United States – or, more properly, Americanism – came to play in the public political discourse of Western Europe, we have to consider the domestic and international problems the elites had to face, as well as the role Americanism (or its opposite, anti-Americanism) played in their strategy. The end of World War II left a world in which the American presence was hegemonic and therefore impossible to ignore, a situation quite similar to that of the Middle East since 1991 (see Lynch in this volume). European polities were either

destroyed or severely tested by the war. Afterward, all four countries had to cope – to different degrees – with a dire economic situation, paired with a crisis of legitimacy that, in countries like Germany and Italy, verged on a crisis of national identity. This twofold challenge of rebuilding both state and nation required creating political legitimacy around a brand new set of political institutions in countries emerging from a deeply divisive war and lacking all or most of the needed material resources.

The contrast with the power and strength of America was striking. Because of the rapid deterioration in East-West relationships, the emergence of a bipolar world, and the modalities through which the American “empire”⁷¹ became established in Western Europe, the American presence and policies were prominent in the minds of both political elites and their electorates. The Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Alliance, and the beginning of the European integration movement were important events in which the U.S. acted, and appeared to act, as the driving force for most of the Western European publics. This overwhelming political presence, carrying the seeds of economic and social modernization and cultural challenge to established traditions in Europe, made the United States, at the end of the Second World War, a “focal point” for both admirers and critics. This historical moment offers a unique vantage point for studying the way in which anti-Americanism emerged and evolved in Western Europe.

In studying the determinants of mass anti-Americanism during the Cold War in these four countries, four factors seem particularly important: (a) direct experience with American military forces during the Second World War (the first truly “shared experience” of America for most Europeans); (b) the actual policies of the American government after the war; (c) the prospects of the Cold War, with particular reference

to the Soviet threat and the risks of war; and finally, (d) the dire economic situations in all four European countries considered here, which helped to create high expectations – often more imagined (Kennedy, this volume) than realistic – of the U.S. as a place to live the good life. I will discuss here what role each of these factors might have played in shaping anti-Americanism in Western Europe, and how I measured them using existing data in order to explore their relative importance.

Memory of the war. The Second World War, much more than the First, fostered the first real mass encounter with America. The American GIs spreading all over Western Europe, with their characteristic physical appearance, tastes, and habits, actually embodied the United States for the first time for large masses of people in many Western European liberated countries. The Second World War therefore offered a unique opportunity for European and American cultures and habits to come in direct contact with one another at the mass level. The consequences of these encounters were significant during the early stages of the Cold War; they affected elite debates on how to frame the interaction with the United States, and possibly exerted an impact on the mass public's image of the U.S. that endures today.

The available evidence seems to indicate that the war experience, and especially the American military occupation, contributed greatly to a positive image of the United States and its people in the eyes of the mass populace. This is true in Germany and Italy, the two defeated countries of the Second World War, as well as in France, liberated in 1944 from Nazi German occupation. Contrary to other Allied contingents (the British, for example), the American soldiers during the 1943-45 period left a remarkably good impression among Italians, French and, to an extent,

even Germans. In October 1946, DOXA asked a sample of 5,013 Italians the following question: “Of all Allied soldiers that you have seen in Italy in the last years, which made the best [worst] impression on you?” Sixty-two percent said that the Americans left the best impression and only 2 percent the worst.⁷² Only 12 percent of the respondents mentioned the British (and Scottish) among those who left the best impression, while 10 percent said that the British (and Scottish) left the worst impression. In March 1945, Gallup asked a French sample, “Do you think American soldiers behave well?” Seven percent answered “always” and 55 percent “generally.” Only 16 percent said “rarely” and 3 percent “never” (19 percent had no opinion). In Germany, where 41 percent of the German respondents in the AMZON had a chance in December 1949 to see American troops during “an average day,” opinions on American troops were good or very good for a majority of the population,⁷³ and they were improving since 1948. Overall, America came out of the immediate aftermath of the Second World War more popular than any other country. The available data cannot tell us how lasting an impression was left; but it is quite clear that political and cultural elites have consistently played on these memories since then.

My hypothesis is that this socializing experience had a positive impact on people’s minds and attitudes toward the United States. I will use age as an admittedly imperfect indicator of this experience. Those living in the four countries at that time had contact with the U.S. on a personal level. As time went by and the experience of the war receded, only members of that cohort still remembered. This difference should show up in cooler sentiments in subsequent decades by the youngest cohort that was not affected by this vivid image of the United States.

The policies of the United States. America's image was also shaped by what the United States did after the war. Its immediate post-war policies played an important role in shaping positive feelings, reinforcing pre-existing attitudes formed during the war and its immediate aftermath. In Italy, for example, a first test came with the Peace Treaty, a source of heated discussion among political parties well after its signing. In October 1946, ten months after discussions were initiated, and during the Conference of Paris at which the final decision was taken, DOXA asked, first, which among the four great powers (France, Great Britain, USSR or the USA) was better disposed toward Italy, and, second, which of the four left the respondents disappointed with the outcome of the peace conference. To the first question, 76 percent of the 5,013 respondents thought that the U.S. was better disposed, 9 percent mentioned the Soviet Union, and only 2 and 5 percent named France and Great Britain, respectively. On the other hand, only 6 percent were disappointed by the U.S., versus 32 percent by the Soviet Union, 21 percent by France, and 27 percent by Great Britain.⁷⁴

Probably the most important (and best known)⁷⁵ postwar policy decision leaving an enduring impact on the image of the United States was the Marshall Plan and its implementation through the European Recovery Program. Solid majorities in all four countries supported it, left-wing parties' opposition in three of the four countries notwithstanding. In January 1948, 65 percent, 60 percent and 60 percent of Italians, French and British respectively were in favor (while 14 percent of Italians, 13 percent of French and 20 percent of British were opposed; between 20 and 27 percent in these three countries had no opinion).⁷⁶ In November 1949, to a French Gallup poll asking whether the Marshall Plan was good or bad for France, 45 percent answered

“good” (25 percent very good) and 23 percent “bad” (15 percent bad and 8 percent rather bad). Thirty-two percent had no opinion.

However, U.S. foreign policy has not always been seen as positive in the various European countries. Since the end of the war, Europe’s relationships with the United States have been marred by crisis and resentment. During the 1950s, the event with the strongest impact on anti-Americanism, observable with the available data, was probably the Suez crisis in the fall of 1956. In its divisiveness on transatlantic relations, particularly in France and the United Kingdom, this crisis can be compared only to the Iraq crisis of 2003. Having attacked Egypt without previous consultation with their American ally, and confronting a possible Soviet nuclear threat, France and the United Kingdom were presented by the Eisenhower government with the stark alternative of withdrawing from the Suez canal or losing U.S. support (and, in the British case, the withdrawal of backing for the Pound Sterling). Both countries stopped the operation and withdrew in good order. This crisis allows us to explore the impact on sentiments toward the United States when its policies undercut the interests of European states.

To examine this dynamic, I will use time, in dummy-years, as an imperfect proxy for the international climate. How the international climate might affect anti-Americanism can also be seen by looking at the state of East-West relationships during the Cold War.

The Soviet Threat and Pro-Sovietism. The positive image of the United States was clearly boosted, at least for some, by the Cold War. There were few doubts among European publics about America’s real hegemonic intentions. The crucial difference

with the Soviet Union, and probably with most of Europe's previous experiences, was that U.S. hegemony was seen as more benevolent, so as to deserve – at least for the public – the label of an “empire by integration.”⁷⁷ On the other hand, suspicion about communism and the Soviet Union was widespread among the populace of these four countries well before the outbreak of the Cold War. Anti-communism was a strong propellant of pro-American sentiments, as the United States was widely viewed as the only bulwark against the Soviet threat, both domestically and internationally. I hypothesize that strong anti-communist sentiments should correlate positively with pro-American views, and vice versa.

A second indicator of the international climate is the fear of war, measured on a thermometer scale in which a low value means the subjective probability estimate of a world war is high. The underlying hypothesis here is that as the level of tension increases, so do feelings of closeness to the U.S.

A country in which to live the good life. A last and important factor is the appeal exerted by the United States as a country in which to live – given the chance – the good life not allowed by the dire postwar economic conditions in Europe. Figure 5 shows a scattergram of the percentage of those who thought the United States gave the “best chance of leading the kind of life you would like to lead” in nine countries surveyed by UNESCO, and the 1949 per capita income in U.S. dollars, as taken by the Statistical Office of the United Nations.⁷⁸ The results show a clear and strong correlation between level of economic hardship and willingness to see the United States as a country in which to live a better life, supporting similar data reported in the present period (see Katzenstein and Keohane, chapter 1, this volume).

[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]

These data confirm what some commentators⁷⁹ have claimed all along: that anti-Americanism in Western Europe is mostly an elite phenomenon, while mass publics are prevalently pro-American. If this hypothesis is true, the better off should be less likely to be pro-American (and, conversely, more anti-American) than the poorer sectors of society. To explore this factor, I used two indicators – socio-economic status (subjectively perceived) and level of education – as a proxy of the respondent's socio-economic conditions.

In conclusion, I suggest that during the Cold War there were four possible sources of anti-Americanism, or more appropriately, of pro-American feelings: the memory of the war and its aftermath, the perception of U.S. policies, and the desirability of the United States as a country in which to live, given people's economic hardship and the perception of threat from the Soviet Union.

Besides these variables, another important factor to consider is the traditional left-right cleavage in each country. Attitudes toward the United States have been critical on both the right and the left. The Cold War, however, by adding an anti-communist dimension to the traditional political cleavages, helped to shape anti-Americanism as a typical left-wing issue. This was particularly true in France and Italy, where strong communist parties helped to influence mass attitudes toward the U.S. and to frame the perceptions of large sectors of society. We should therefore expect to find that, in general, left-wing parties are more anti-American than right-wing parties, and in France and Italy more so than in Germany and Great Britain.

To assess the relative weights of these determinants in explaining anti-Americanism during the Cold War at the mass level, I will use a set of surveys carried out in France, (Western) Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom between 1952 and 1970. Table 7 reports on all of the surveys I was able to locate in which a question on anti-Americanism was asked. Of the seventy surveys carried out in the four countries considered here, over twenty-five points in time between 1952 and 1970, sixty-one had at least one question on anti-Americanism. In ten cases, identical surveys were carried out in the same period in all four countries, for a total of forty surveys.

My analysis is based on two partially overlapping sets of data. A first set is comprised of the forty concurrent surveys in all four countries. This analysis, depending on the variables included, ranges from 1955 to 1969.⁸⁰ A second set of analyses, exploring a longer time span, is based on all surveys in which the anti-Americanism question was asked in each country. The time span here varies across countries, ranging from 1952 to 1970 in the Italian case, from 1954 to 1969 in the British case, and from 1955 to 1970 in Germany and France.⁸¹ All results presented here are based on an ordinary least squares estimate. I also conducted an ordinal logit regression (results supplied upon request). Since the two methods do not produce dramatically different results, for the sake of clarity, only the OLS estimates are discussed.

The dependent variable is obtained using three different indicators of anti-Americanism (see Appendix 1). They have all been transformed into an ordinal variable with three categories, where 1 means a good opinion of the U.S., 3 a mixed feeling, and 5 a negative opinion. As the value of this variable increases, so does anti-Americanism.⁸²

Models and Results

This is a cross-section time series analysis of repeated surveys over time; that is, surveys asking the same questions to different samples of the reference population.⁸³ It tests the influence of this set of factors on anti-Americanism and whether they changed over time, using a “changing-parameter model.”⁸⁴ The rationale is that, given the fluctuating evolution of anti-Americanism, its determinants have been changing as well, depending on the international climate. To test this general hypothesis, I modeled the changing-parameter model through a set of interaction terms, one for every year in which the survey was carried out.⁸⁵

To assess the changing parameter model, I used four main sets of interaction-terms: threat perception, anti-Sovietism, age, and party preference. In the discussion, I will present the general model (Model 1 in Table 8) as a reference point. It includes all variables and covers the shortest period (1956, 1957, 1958, and 1960), with 1960 and Great Britain as baselines. I then compare the effects of further refinements introduced either by the changing parameter models, or by country-specific analyses.

Gender, education, and age all influence the dependent variable in the expected direction. Males are more likely to be anti-American than females. This is true in all countries and in all models. The coefficient is always significant, except in the British case. Age has mixed effects. In Model 1, the results are in the expected direction: older cohorts are more likely to be anti-American than younger ones. This is due, I surmise, to their different socializing experiences. The younger cohort experienced the (positive) American presence, while the older one reflected the anti-American climate of the ‘30s and the war. However, the baseline Model 1 hides some

interesting country differences. The age coefficient is in the expected direction and significant only in Germany (where the coefficient is always significant) and in Great Britain. In Italy and France, the coefficient is often insignificant and in the opposite direction – that is, older generations are less anti-American than younger ones. This sign reversal might be because left-wing (especially Communist) voters, traditionally more anti-American, are also younger. Conversely, there is no time-dependent change of the age coefficient, either in the general model or in the country models. I therefore did not include a change-parameter interaction term for age in subsequent analyses.

As to education, the best educated are less anti-American than the less educated.⁸⁶ Assuming that this is an indicator of the respondent's position in the social structure, an assumption borne out by the limited access to higher education for lower classes in Europe in that period, the relationship runs against what has been hypothesized by some scholars and reported above:⁸⁷ that anti-Americanism in Europe is an elite phenomenon. This is always true across countries. The social elites of the country – in this admittedly loose definition – are more pro-American than the general populace (with one exception, Germany, where the coefficient is in the opposite direction but is not significant).

[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]

Taking into account now the time and country dummies, they are all strong in the predicted direction and significant. France is more anti-American than Great Britain (the baseline), while Italy and Germany are less so. As to the impact of time, a proxy for the general world climate – in Model 1, which covers only the period 1956-

60 (with 1960 as baseline) – the results are in the expected direction: positively correlated with anti-Americanism and decreasingly so. 1956, the year of the Suez crisis and the Hungarian revolt, has, as expected, the greatest positive impact on anti-Americanism. The time-effect then remains positive but declines over time. With a longer time perspective (as in Model 2, which covers the period 1955-1969), time has a curvilinear impact on anti-Americanism. It is positive, with increasing anti-Americanism, in the late 1950s becoming negative in the 1960s. This is clearly related to the level of East-West tension and the general climate of the Cold War. To test this effect more precisely, I also used the level of U.S.-USSR tension, as measured by the COPDAB East-West conflict indicator.⁸⁸ The relationship is confirmed. When tension is high, anti-Americanism increases; when it is low, it declines.

Moving now to the attitudinal variables, Table 8 shows that anti-Soviet and pro-American sentiments are strongly related during this stage of the Cold War. This variable is strong and significant and in the expected direction in all countries. Its impact is strongest in Italy (confirming what was found in Table 5, discussed in section I). The threat of war is not significantly related to anti-Americanism in Model 1. The sign shows that the less you believe a war will break out, the more anti-American you are. In other words, the greater a respondent's fear of the possibility of war, the more likely she would be pro-American. Also, not surprisingly, the Right-Left cleavage significantly affects anti-Americanism. Right-wing voters are more likely to be pro-American than left-wing voters. This general result, however, hides some interesting national differences. In Italy, both the right and the left are more anti-American, with the center more pro-American. In Germany and Great Britain, right-wing voters are less likely to be anti-American, while being on the left does not

move them further toward the anti-American camp. France is the country in which the relationship found in the general model holds: those on the left are significantly more anti-American, while those on the right significantly less so. These results qualify the different national impacts of anti-Americanism on the right-left cleavage.

Examining now in more detail how some of our parameters' impact changes over time, I focused my attention on two variables: the threat of war, and anti-Sovietism. The first is relevant for our discussion on the dimensions of anti-Americanism in section I, and the second because of the earlier argument that anti-Sovietism did not always play a crucial role in explaining anti-Americanism. A dynamic perspective throws more light on these issues.

Model 3 (Table 8) examines both of these effects between 1956 and 1960. This period offers a quasi-experimental situation to study the complex impact of events and attitudes on anti-Americanism. To model this impact, I estimated the interactive effect of the 1956 events and both the image of the Soviet Union and the perception of threat on anti-Americanism. Here we can see that the 1956 crisis had the effect of increasing the salience of both threat perception and anti-Sovietism, with a differentiated impact on anti-Americanism.

Since the interactive impact of time and attitudes toward the Soviet Union on anti-Americanism can be seen over a longer term perspective (see discussion below on table 9), I first assess the impact of threat perception. Models 1 and 2 have already shown that the perception of threat has either no impact or a slightly negative one on anti-Americanism. Overall, the more one perceives the threat of war, the less likely one is to be anti-American. This is in line with the hypothesis that anti-Americanism is composed of different dimensions, mastery and threat, which can be relevant in

different ways for different people. Those who are also worried about war in a relatively quiet political period are more likely to be driven by the threat dimension and to see in the United States a way to cope with their worries. However, things seem to change with the worsening international climate. As the level of international tension increases, the perception of threat not only becomes statistically significant, but it also reverses its sign. Its impact, once negative, becomes positive: Those who are afraid of a war become more anti-American. This is consistent with our description of anti-Americanism as a feeling based on two main dimensions – one positive and another negative – related to the ability of the U.S. to exert its leadership in a responsible way. When the threat of war increases, the threat dimension of anti-Americanism becomes more important for some people than the mastery dimension. This contributes to increasing the level of anti-Americanism. When the threat of war decreases, threat perception has either no impact or a negative one on anti-Americanism. In other words, in times of détente, those who are more worried about war are also more sympathetic toward the United States. In times of tension, those who are more worried are less sympathetic, while the least worried are more sympathetic toward the United States.

Anti-Soviet attitudes also play upon anti-American attitudes in complex ways, interacting with both country and time period. To model this third-order effect, I reported both interaction terms in Table 9. Looking first at the general pattern, one can see that in all four countries, the impact of anti-Sovietism on anti-Americanism is negative: those who are more anti-Soviet are also more pro-American, and vice versa. Moreover, in all countries, this relationship becomes less and less important in shaping attitudes toward the U.S. as time goes by. Finally, this general pattern shows

some important national differences that interact with the degree of East-West tension. When tension exists, we can see that the impact is always in the same direction, but it is of different strengths. In France, the impact of tension on anti-Sovietism is absent or negligible in shaping anti-Americanism, while in Italy, Germany, and Great Britain, in this order, political tension contributes to further strengthening of the negative relationship found at the general level.

Even more interesting is the dynamic when the level of tension is low. In this case, the strength of anti-Sovietism in shaping anti-Americanism declines. Again, there are important national differences. In Italy, the relationship remains negative, but weaker than during periods of tension. In Germany and Great Britain, the relationship almost disappears. In France, the direction of the relationship changes: those who are anti-American become also anti-Soviet, and vice versa. The data point to the intriguing result that in a climate of bipolar détente, anti-Americanism and anti-Sovietism run in parallel. This seems to be the case in Germany as well. The major difference between these two countries is that the effect occurs later in Germany than in France. These results seem to indicate a pattern that we found in the recent Iraq crisis as well. The major source of anti-Americanism in France and, to a lesser extent in Germany, was related to the “hyperpuissance” of the United States in a unipolar war, rather than to more deeply entrenched beliefs. These results seem to suggest that the pattern we observed during the Iraqi crisis in 2002-04 has its roots in attitudes shaped well before the recent events of the Cold War.

[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]

Conclusions

This paper conveys a twofold message. The first stems from the controversial nature of anti-Americanism, a concept looking for an empirical referent, rather than vice versa. To link one to the other, I chose to narrow its scope. I postulated, with the support of the indicators commonly used to measure it, that anti-Americanism is a psychological, emotional mood that helps us to frame a set of phenomena and objects attributed to the U.S. I hope to have convincingly argued my case, marshalling two main sets of evidence. The first shows that ordinary people, busy as they are in their own personal activities, can still entertain a differentiated and complex set of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about the U.S., its people, institutions, and policies. These beliefs, attitudes, and feelings do not coalesce in a coherent syndrome – of the kind Hollander has in mind in speaking of anti-Americanism – but neither do they “morselize” into a set of undifferentiated non-attitudes of the kind Converse sees as crowding people’s minds when they discuss politics. They are knitted together, but not strictly so. Sometimes they are loose, because the connections are not there when we look for them, or because people are more likely than we expect to elicit differences when they are relevant.

The second set of evidence is the multidimensional – more precisely, bidimensional – nature of our feelings toward the United States. When considering a political object as complex and multifarious as the U.S., people can entertain several feelings at the same time. This does not necessarily mean that people balance out their considerations or that they are ambivalent, but simply that different dimensions are at the same time important to different degrees for different people, and that their

relative relevance in shaping our general feelings toward the U.S. can change. Events are the main engine behind this change. The interaction terms captured by time and the perception of threat reported in Table 8 shed some light on why anti-Americanism spikes and bounces back so quickly.

By implication, my second message is that anti-Americanism is mostly driven by our assessment of what Americans – or, more appropriately, the American government – does, or what we think it does. And here, I would like to stress the verb “think.” The longitudinal analysis shows that, no matter how important events are, they only play a role to the extent that they interact with other attitudes and beliefs, and in so doing shape our feelings toward America. These attitudes are somehow an individual constellation of experiences, beliefs, and sentiments that lead us to orient in one way or the other. As I have shown, anti-Soviet attitudes and the level of tension interact in producing an impact on anti-Americanism. It is different if we hate (or love, for that matter) the Soviet Union in a period of tension or in time of *détente*. But this is not the whole story. Much variance is still explained by purely national factors, as the significance of our country-dummies testify. Anti-Americanism, as beauty, is often in the eye of the beholder.

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
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
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Figure 1 – Emotional reactions to the United States on 12 Mood terms




Source: USIA XX-5, August 1955 (France, Germany, United Kingdom pooled)

Figure 2 – Model of Emotional feelings toward the US




Source: USIA XX-5, August 1955 (France, Germany, United Kingdom pooled). Standardized scores.
 Chi-Square = 321.573 (57 Dgf), significant at the 0.001 level
 Comparative Fit Index (Cfi) = 0.934

Figure 3 – Trend in net attitudes toward the United States




The vertical line reports the net favor toward the United States, measured by subtracting those who have a bad opinion of the U.S. from those with a good opinion. A positive number means that the percentage of those having a positive opinion is higher than that of those having a bad opinion and a negative sign the opposite.
 Sources: USIA XX-series 1952-1967, Eurobarometer series 1970-2000, Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002 and Transatlantic Trend Survey 2002-2004

Figure 4 – Trend in net attitudes toward the United States (normalized average, yearly base)



For details on how it has been computed, see text.
Source: same as Figure 1

Figure 5 - Relation between per capita income and willingness to move to U.S. for better life



Source: Buchanan and Cantril, 1948

Table 1 – Feelings toward Americans and the United States (in %)

| | <i>October 1958</i> | | <i>June 2002</i> | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|
| | <i>Nation</i> | <i>People</i> | <i>Nation</i> | <i>People</i> |
| <i>Very good/Very favorable</i> | 15 | 15 | 13 | 14 |
| <i>Good/favorable</i> | 43 | 41 | 52 | 59 |
| <i>Fair</i> | 22 | 27 | na | na |
| <i>Bad/Unfavorable</i> | 8 | 7 | 24 | 17 |
| <i>Very bad/Very Unfavorable</i> | 2 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| <i>DK</i> | 10 | 8 | 5 | 6 |
| <i>Total</i> | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| | (2475) | (2404) | (2516) | (2516) |

Sources: 1958: XX-11 USIA; 2002: PEW Global attitude survey. Pooled countries: France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom.

Table 2 – Favor toward the United States and Americans (PEW Global Survey 2002)

| Favor toward US | Favor toward Americans | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|--------------|
| | Favor | Unfavor | Total |
| Favor | 66% | 3% | 69% (1611) |
| Disfavor | 11% | 19% | 30% (707) |
| Total | 77% | 22% | 100% |
| (N) | (1804) | (514) | (2318) |

France, Germany, Italy, and United Kingdom pooled. DKs excluded

Table 3 – Assessment of the preferred, national, and American economic system

| | Preferred | National | US |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------|
| France | 5,2 | 6,8 | 10,0 |
| Italy | 5,3 | 6,7 | 10,2 |
| Great Britain | 5,6 | 7,2 | 9,79 |
| Germany | 5,6 | 7,7 | 10,0 |
| Average | 5,4 | 7,1 | 10,0 |

Source: USIA XX-14 Form A, June 1962.

Average score. Range: 1 Completely socialistic – 11 Completely Capitalistic.

Table 4 - Opinion on U.S. economic system and U.S. Capitalism (split-half sample, June 1962)

| | <i>Germany</i> | | <i>France</i> | | <i>Great Britain</i> | | <i>Italy</i> | |
|------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|
| | <i>US economic system</i> | <i>US Capitalism</i> | <i>US economic system</i> | <i>Capitalism</i> | <i>US economic system</i> | <i>Capitalism</i> | <i>US economic system</i> | <i>Capitalism</i> |
| <i>Very Good</i> | 14 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 26 | 8 |
| <i>Good</i> | 49 | 29 | 33 | 15 | 30 | 19 | 32 | 27 |
| <i>Neither</i> | 17 | 37 | 27 | 33 | 25 | 29 | 11 | 25 |
| <i>Bad</i> | 3 | 7 | 9 | 14 | 9 | 11 | 3 | 5 |
| <i>Very Bad</i> | 2 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 6 |
| <i>DK</i> | 15 | 21 | 24 | 29 | 27 | 34 | 26 | 29 |
| <i>Total</i> | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| <i>N</i> | 614 | 620 | 692 | 615 | 614 | 647 | 672 | 672 |

Source: USIA XX-14. The difference of the means for the two split-half groups, in the pooled sample, has a t-value = -16.25, significant at the 0.001 level. Pearson Chi-square = 283.45, significant at the 0.001 level. One-way ANOVA F-ratio = 264.04, significant at level 0.001.

Table 5 –Determinants of general feelings toward the U.S. (OLS-estimate)

| | B | Beta | Standard error |
|---------------------------------|----------|-------------|-----------------------|
| Constant | 0.896*** | | 0.248 |
| <i>US international policy</i> | 0.221*** | 0.240*** | 0.037 |
| <i>US cultural life</i> | 0.267*** | 0.273*** | 0.035 |
| <i>US domestic politics</i> | 0.132** | 0.144** | 0.041 |
| <i>Economic attitudes</i> | -0.103* | -0.080* | 0.046 |
| <i>US Business</i> | 0.051 | 0.052 | 0.038 |
| <i>Pro-Soviet</i> | -0.063* | -0.076* | 0.030 |
| <i>Germany</i> | 0.105 | 0.050 | 0.078 |
| <i>France</i> | 0.191* | 0.071* | 0.096 |
| <i>Italy</i> | -0.046 | -0.022 | 0.080 |
| <i>R's sex</i> | 0.038 | 0.020 | 0.061 |
| <i>R's age</i> | 0.021 | 0.020 | 0.033 |
| <i>Education recoded</i> | 0.008 | 0.035 | 0.008 |
| <i>Party preference recoded</i> | -0.020 | -0.019 | 0.037 |
| <i>Adj. R²</i> | 0.387 | | |
| SEE | 0.726 | | |
| N | 634 | | |

Dependent variable: Feelings toward Americans: 1 very good opinion – 5 very bad opinion.

Baseline United Kingdom.

Independent variables: Opinion U.S. foreign policy: 1 very favorable – 4 very unfavorable; Opinion cultural life U.S.: 1 very good – 5 very bad; Opinion domestic politics in U.S.: 1 very good – 5 very bad; Opinion business life in U.S.: 1 very good – 5 very bad; U.S. economy attitudes 0 Negative, 1 mixed, 2 Positive.

Control variables: Sex, Age, education. and party preference.

*** p significant >.001 ** p significant >.01 * p significant >.05

Source: USIA XX-11, 1958

Table 6 – Emotional Mood reactions to U.S.

| | <i>West Germany</i> | | <i>France</i> | | <i>Great Britain</i> | | <i>Italy</i> |
|----------------------|---------------------|------|---------------|------|----------------------|------|--------------|
| | 1955 | 1961 | 1955 | 1961 | 1955 | 1961 | 1955 |
| <i>Peace-loving</i> | 40 | 59 | 45 | 50 | 44 | 33 | 55 |
| <i>Aggressive</i> | 3 | 4 | 20 | 10 | 12 | 9 | 6 |
| <i>Imperialistic</i> | 10 | 11 | 31 | 25 | 6 | 5 | 19 |
| <i>Materialistic</i> | 30 | 30 | 39 | 34 | 22 | 28 | 5 |
| <i>Cultured</i> | 37 | 55 | 38 | 33 | 15 | 11 | 26 |
| <i>Immature</i> | 2 | 3 | 17 | 17 | 10 | 18 | 7 |
| <i>Trustworthy</i> | 31 | 54 | 27 | 38 | 24 | 25 | 33 |
| <i>Domineering</i> | 12 | 8 | 36 | 31 | 25 | 31 | 9 |
| <i>Reckless</i> | 7 | 6 | 11 | 11 | 19 | 19 | 9 |
| <i>Democratic</i> | 54 | 73 | 58 | 46 | 42 | 43 | 65 |
| <i>Religious</i> | 23 | 38 | 32 | 48 | 18 | 16 | 21 |
| <i>Cooperative</i> | 67 | 68 | 49 | 27 | 28 | 24 | Na |

Multiple Dichotomy, % Respondents
 USIA 1955 and 1961 describe countries

Table 7 - Surveys available for the analysis of anti-Americanism

| Study Number | Date | Germany | France | Great Britain | Italy |
|---------------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------|
| XX-1 (218) | 09.52 | | | | 1505 |
| XX-2 | 10.54 | 836 | 847 | 832 | |
| XX-3 | 02.55 | 820 | 899 | 805 | |
| XX-4 | 06.55 | 857 | 790 | 790 | 810 |
| XX-5 | 08.55 | 864 | 790 | 788 | 792 |
| XX-6 | 11.55 | 813 | 803 | 814 | |
| XX-7 | 04.56 | 863 | | 799 | |
| XX-8 | 11.56 | 1138 | 1206 | 1188 | 1188 |
| XX-9 | 05.57 | 1106 | 1156 | 1231 | 1267 |
| XX-10 | 11.57 | 783 | 779 | | |
| XX-11 | 10.58 | 604 | 626 | 610 | 635 |
| XX-12 | 02.60 | 1222 | 1228 | 1221 | 1170 |
| XX-12,5 | 05.60 | 1010 | | | |
| XX-13 | 06.61 | 1145 | 1330 | 1283 | |
| XX-14 | 06.62 | 1234 | 1307 | 1261 | 1344 |
| XX-15 | 01.63 | 1176 | 378 | 1195 | |
| XX-16 | 02.64 | 1200 | 1215 | 1055 | 1175 |
| XX-17 | 05.65 | 1199 | 1228 | 1178 | 1164 |
| XX-18 | 10.69 | 1703 | 1208 | 1159 | 1202 |
| EUB-70 | 07.70 | 2014 | 2046 | | 1806 |
| Total | | 20587 | 17836 | 16209 | 14058 |

Sample size in cells, including DKs

Table 8 – OLS estimate of determinants of anti-Americanism

| | <i>Model 1</i> (1956-1960) | | <i>Model 2</i> (1955-1969) | | <i>Model 3</i> (1956-60) | |
|---|-------------------------------|-------|-------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------|-------|
| | B | Beta | B | Beta | B | Beta |
| <i>Constant</i> | 1,988*** | | 2,244*** | | 1,651*** | |
| | 0.079 | | 0.040 | | 0.101 | |
| <i>Sex (0=female 1=male)</i> | ,067* | ,025 | ,077*** | ,030 | ,073** | ,027 |
| | 0.027 | | 0.013 | | 0.027 | |
| <i>Age in 4 classes (<29 30-44 45-64 >65)</i> | ,032* | ,021 | ,006 | ,004 | ,034* | ,023 |
| | 0.015 | | 0.008 | | 0.015 | |
| <i>Education (1 No school – 4 University)</i> | -,043* | -,026 | -,019* | -,013 | -,038* | -,022 |
| | 0.017 | | 0.008 | | 0.017 | |
| <i>Attitudes Toward USSR (1 Good – 5 Bad)</i> | -,128*** | -,132 | -,080*** | -,093 | -,056** | -,057 |
| | 0.010 | | 0.005 | | 0.019 | |
| <i>Danger of war thermometer (1=100 war – 11=0 war)</i> | -,001 | -,003 | - | - | ,025* | ,060 |
| | 0.005 | | | | 0.012 | |
| <i>Right (1=right wing party)</i> | -,087* | -,026 | -,155*** | -,049 | -,085* | -,025 |
| | 0.039 | | 0.019 | | 0.039 | |
| <i>Left (1=Left wing party)</i> | ,326*** | ,111 | ,281*** | ,099 | ,310*** | ,105 |
| | 0.033 | | 0.017 | | 0.033 | |
| <i>Germany</i> | -,242*** | -,083 | -,289*** | -,102 | -,262*** | -,090 |
| | 0.041 | | 0.019 | | 0.041 | |
| <i>France</i> | ,774*** | ,256 | ,387*** | ,123 | ,746*** | ,247 |
| | 0.044 | | 0.021 | | 0.044 | |
| <i>Italy</i> | -,168*** | -,049 | -,313*** | -,106 | -,205*** | -,060 |
| | 0.046 | | 0.020 | | 0.046 | |
| <i>Dummy56</i> | ,402*** | ,119 | ,072** | ,018 | ,974*** | ,289 |
| | 0.049 | | 0.026 | | 0.182 | |

| | <i>Model 1 (1956-1960)</i> | | <i>Model 2 (1955-1969)</i> | | <i>Model 3 (1956-60)</i> | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|------|--------------------------------|-------|------------------------------|-------|
| <i>Dummy57</i> | ,346*** 0.038 | ,124 | ,060* 0.026 | ,015 | ,720*** 0.114 | ,257 |
| <i>Dummy58</i> | ,246*** 0.048 | ,073 | -,012 0.032 | -,002 | 1,197*** 0.146 | ,357 |
| <i>Dummy60</i> | | - | -,215*** 0.026 | -,054 | - | - |
| <i>Dummy62</i> | | - | -,188*** 0.027 | -,045 | - | - |
| <i>Dummy64</i> | | - | -,416*** 0.026 | -,106 | - | - |
| <i>Dummy65</i> | | - | -,275*** 0.029 | -,060 | - | - |
| <i>Dummy69</i> | | - | -,028*** 0.026 | -,007 | - | - |
| <i>Threat56</i> | - | - | - | - | -,058*** 0.016 | -,134 |
| <i>Threat57</i> | - | - | - | - | ,009 0.015 | ,016 |
| <i>Threat58</i> | - | - | - | - | -,086*** 0.017 | -,218 |
| <i>Soviet56</i> | - | - | - | - | -,073* 0.035 | -,102 |
| <i>Soviet57</i> | - | - | - | - | -,114*** 0.025 | -,185 |
| <i>Soviet58</i> | - | - | - | - | -,107*** 0.027 | -,135 |

| | <i>Model 1 (1956-1960)</i> | <i>Model 2 (1955-1969)</i> | <i>Model 3 (1956-60)</i> |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|
| <i>Adjusted R²</i> | 0.155 | 0.096 | 0.162 |
| <i>SEE</i> | 1.204 | 1.217 | 1.247 |
| <i>N</i> | 8,688 | 33,670 | 8,688 |

Standard error among parentheses. 1960 and United Kingdom as baselines.

Table 9 –Impact of Soviet attitudes on anti-Americanism and change over time.

| | <i>France</i> | | <i>Germany</i> | | <i>Italy</i> | | <i>United Kingdom</i> | |
|---|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|-----------------------|----------|
| | <i>b</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>b</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>b</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>b</i> | <i>B</i> |
| <i>Attitudes Toward USSR (1 Good – 5 Bad)</i> | -,063*** 0.012 | -,074 | -,063*** 0.012 | -,074 | -,063*** 0.012 | -,074 | -,063*** 0.012 | -,074 |
| <i>1956</i> | ,019 0.023 | ,011 | -,151*** 0.022 | -,094 | -,233*** 0.023 | -,141 | -,109*** 0.023 | -,070 |
| <i>1957</i> | -,011 0.022 | -,006 | -,113*** 0.020 | -,069 | -,223*** 0.021 | -,131 | -,124*** 0.021 | -,073 |
| <i>1958</i> | ,007 0.025 | ,003 | -,100*** 0.024 | -,043 | -,191*** 0.025 | -,073 | -,113*** 0.026 | -,043 |
| <i>1960</i> | ,076*** 0.021 | ,035 | ,004 0.018 | ,002 | -,060** 0.020 | -,028 | -,022 0.021 | -,011 |
| <i>1962</i> | ,019 0.023 | ,007 | -,012 0.019 | -,008 | -,085*** 0.021 | -,044 | -,014 0.021 | -,007 |
| <i>1964</i> | ,145*** 0.022 | ,067 | ,023 0.018 | ,014 | -,035 0.020 | -,017 | ,025 0.021 | ,012 |
| <i>1965</i> | na | na | ,043* 0.020 | ,025 | -,011 0.022 | -,005 | ,063** 0.023 | ,029 |
| <i>1969</i> | ,035 0.022 | ,015 | ,048** 0.018 | ,031 | -,013 0.020 | -,006 | ,057** 0.021 | ,028 |

Source: Other regressors as in model 2 in Table 8. Adjusted R2 = 0.113, Standard error of estimate = 1.205, N=33,670.
Standard error in parentheses

Notes

¹ Some of the ideas on which this paper is based have been presented at the workshop organized by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) on “The Media-Public Opinion-Policy Nexus in German-American Relations.” April 22, 2005, Berlin. I also greatly benefited from the discussion with the participants in the conference on “Anti-Americanism and its consequences” held at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Palo Alto in June 2005. I thank the two editors and Paul Sniderman for their very careful comments on a preliminary draft of this paper. I gratefully acknowledge the help of Linda Fratini for the bibliographic search. Davide Orsini located and collected the relevant questions on anti-Americanism and Sara Franceschi assisted me in some of the statistical analyses. Teresa Ammendola and Sara Franceschi contributed respectively to building the individual level longitudinal dataset covering the period 1952-1970 and to checking its consistency. Analysis have been conducted, unless otherwise noted, using SPSS version 12.0, STATA/SE 9 and EQS.

² Schulte Nordholt 1986, 7.

³ Rubinstein and Smith 1985, 25.

⁴ See Teodori 2002 for Italy; Debouzy 1996 and Kuisel 1993 for France.

⁵ Hollander 1995.

⁶ Kuisel 1993; Roger 2004.

⁷ Der Derian 1986.

⁸ D’Attorre, 1986.

⁹ Kroes 1986.

¹⁰ But see Ellwood 2003 and Markovits 2004.

¹¹ E.g. Hollander 1995; Haseler 1985.

¹² Page and Shapiro 1993; Stimson 1991.

¹³ Without pretending to be exhaustive, I have based my analysis on the following texts: Crockatt 2003; Kroes and van Rossem 1986; D'Atorre 1991; Defleur and Defleur 2003; Diner 1996; Elwood 1999. Haseler 1985; Hollander 1995; Kuisel 1993; Lacorne 1986 ; Pells 1997; Rubinstein and Smith 1985; Spiro 1998; Strauss 1978; Teodori 2002; 2003; Toinet 1988.

¹⁴ E.g. Hollander, Haseler and Markovits.

¹⁵ E.g. Smith and Wertman 1991.

¹⁶ Johnston and Ray 2004; Chiozza 2004, but see also Chiozza in this volume.

¹⁷ Kelman 1966, 24.

¹⁸ Scott 1966, 72.

¹⁹ Deutsch and Merritt 1966.

²⁰ Scott 1966, 72.

²¹ Eagly and Chaiken 1993.

²² The concept of mood in psychology defines one of the many possible affective states. I found the functional definition of mood, as distinct from emotion, introduced by Davidson (1994, 51-55) useful in disentangling the prototypical characteristics of anti-Americanism. The concept of mood in psychology is related to, although not totally overlapping with, its use in public opinion research (e.g. Klingberg 1983 and Stimson 1991).

²³ Davidson 1994, 52.

²⁴ See also the discussion in Smith and Wertman 1992, 93-103.

²⁵ The United States Information Agency has been asking the following question, with slight variations, for more than thirty years: “Please, use this card, to tell me your feelings about various countries. How about US?” The Eurobarometer series of the European Commission has been asking, in the Eurobarometer 22, 24, 27 and 28, a more direct version of this same question, worded as follows: “Do you have a very good, fairly good, neither bad nor good, rather bad or very bad opinion of the United States?” Those who answered “neither good nor bad” were probed: “on balance would you say that your feelings toward the United States are more favorable or more unfavorable? In Eurobarometer 17, the question was, “What is your overall opinion of the U.S.? Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion?” This wording was also used in the PEW Global Attitudes Survey in 2002.

²⁶ In the period between October 1952 and April 1956, the intermediate option “Fair” was used. Since November 1956, the option “Neither Good nor bad” has been used. In November 1956 and in May 1957, each of the two formats was submitted to half of the sample, to test for possible differences. Of the eight available comparisons (two for each of the four countries here examined), in France and Italy no difference was greater than 2-3 percent, in Germany in one case (May 1957) the difference was 8 percent, and in Great Britain 10 and 13 percent respectively for November 1956 and May 1957. In each of the three cases in which the wording of the intermediate category makes a difference greater than 3 percent, the effect is in the same direction: to increase the number of those who have a “good opinion” when the “neither good

nor bad” category is offered in comparison to when the “Fair” category is supplied. Apparently, the item “Fair” seems to capture some of the positive feelings, while “neither good nor bad” seems more neutral. For my trend purposes, this source of difference is unproblematic, because I will use net favor (favorable minus unfavorable).

²⁷ An example of this question format is found in Eurobarometer 10/A: “Here is a sort of scale. You will notice that the 10 boxes on this card range from the highest position for plus 5, for something you have a very favorable opinion of, all the way down to the lowest position of minus 5, for something you have very favorable opinion of. How far up or down the scale would you place [United States].” The standard feeling thermometer scale has also been used by the Transatlantic Trend Survey (drawing upon the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations Survey for the United States) since 2002. The question is as follows: “Next I’d like you to rate your feelings toward some countries, institutions and people, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred. If you have no opinion or have never heard of that country or institution, please say so [The United States].”

²⁸ Since 1970, Eurobarometer has been irregularly asking, in slightly different formats, a question about trust in the American people, using slightly different wordings: “I would like to ask you, now some questions about the trust you have in different peoples of the world. I will give you the names of different peoples; will you tell me if you have a lot of trust in them, some trust, not so much trust, or no trust at

all. You can answer with the help of this card [the Americans]? Or: “Now I would like to ask you about how much you would trust people from different countries. For each country please say whether, in your opinion they are in general very trustworthy, fairly trustworthy, not particularly trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy? [Americans].” This question was asked in Eurobarometer 6, 14, 17, and 25. In Eurobarometer 33, the question was: “Now I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust of them, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all? [Americans].”

²⁹ Understandably, however, this image of innocence of the German people deteriorated as the war progressed. The percentage of those believing that the Germans were “warlike” increased from less than a fifth to approximately a third, and the percentage of those who viewed Germans as “peaceable” went down from slightly more than 40 percent to a fourth of the sample. The prevalent image however remained that of a “basically peaceful but gullible” people (Merritt, 1995).

³⁰ Merritt 1995, 37-40.

³¹ Mueller 1994, 79.

³² Gallup 1947.

³³ A similar conclusion is reached in comparing the results of a split-half experiment run in Fortune magazine in 1939. More people claimed to be friendly to “all people” and unfriendly to “none” than those who claimed friendship toward “all governments” (Buchanan and Cantril 1953, 117).

³⁴ Buchanan and Cantril 1953, 40.

³⁵ Abravanel and Hughes 1973, 113.

³⁶ Abravanel and Hughes 1973, 114.

³⁷ An exact comparison between the 1958 and 2002 versions is complicated not only by what was discussed in note 11, but also by the fact that in the 2002 PEW survey the intermediate, stand-by category of “Fair” was not offered. This inflates the number of those opposing and favoring somewhat the United States or the Americans.

³⁸ And this is even more remarkable given the fact that both questions were asked to each respondent, one after the other, creating a certain pressure toward consistency that presumably reduces the differences between people and government.

³⁹ The question was worded as follows: “Now, I would like to ask about how much you would trust people from different countries. For each country please say whether in your opinion they are in general very trustworthy, fairly trustworthy, not particularly trustworthy or not at all trustworthy [Americans, specify Americans from the United States].

⁴⁰ The question was: “What is your overall opinion of the United States? Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion?”

⁴¹ Recently, there has been some expression of anti-American feelings among West-Europeans. How would you describe your own feelings? Strongly anti-American, somewhat anti-American, somewhat pro-American or strongly pro-American?”

⁴² In the Eurobarometer 22 (October-November 1984), the feelings toward the United States and the anti-Americanism questions were posed again. The correlation among

the two is, for the four countries pooled, -0.604, significant at the 0.001 level for a two-tailed test.

⁴³ Smith and Wertman 1992, 94.

⁴⁴ Given the generally fairly positive results in terms of sympathy, trust and respect for the United States that surveys convey, it is somewhat misleading to (continue to) use the term “anti- Americanism” for this indicator. I will conform however to the general usage here.

⁴⁵ Sondages quoted in Kuisel 1993, 29.

⁴⁶ Pew 2002 Global Attitude Survey.

⁴⁷ Hollander 1995, 54-55.

⁴⁸ The attack on America as the epitome of capitalism has traditionally moved, in Europe, from both Right and Left, in different periods. In the ‘30s it was the European Right that stressed the negative social consequences of capitalism: individualism, consumerism, anomie, and political alienation and, more generally, the destruction of traditional social bonds and texture. After the Second World War, it was the Left who pointed out the negative worldwide consequences of capitalism as an inherently aggressive, exploitative and neo-colonialist system (Teodori 2002, 71-97).

⁴⁹ The question was asked to only half of the sample and it recited: “Suppose we go back to the ladder again and lay it on its side. Let’s think of one end as a completely socialistic economy, the other as a completely capitalistic economy [Show Card C]. Thinking of the kind of economic system you in general like best, about where would you place this system along the ladder – at the completely socialistic end, the completely capitalistic end, or some mixture of the two? What step?”

⁵⁰ This choice probably hides a share of pure guessers (Sniderman et al. 1984) that prudentially locate themselves in the middle. The level of education, however, has no significant impact on the distribution, with the modal category for both education groups in the middle, and some polarization at both extremes, with the better educated more likely to be pro-capitalistic and the lesser educated more likely to be pro-socialist. These might be both signs that the amount of guessing is quite limited.

⁵¹ Fifty-six percent of those interviewed with an opinion in these four countries in 1962 had a good or very good opinion of socialism, while only 22 percent had a favorable opinion of capitalism.

⁵² The exact wording of the question was “About where along the ladder would you place the present economic system in the following countries – at the completely socialistic end, the completely capitalistic end, or some mixture of the two? First, what step for the economic system in [Sweden, Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, United States]? And ...?”

⁵³ The impact of the experimental factor remains significant in all the four countries’ samples using both a t-value test and a one-way ANOVA F-ratio.

⁵⁴ Those who answered “no, it is not true” to the first statement and “yes, it is true” to the second were coded as having a positive economic orientation toward the U.S. economic system; while those who thought the opposite (that is, that the U.S. economic system brings forth recurrent economic crises and that the system does not benefit the most) were coded as having a negative economic opinion of the U.S.; all other possible combinations were coded as mixed.

⁵⁵ The table is not reported here but is available upon request from the author.

⁵⁶ Smith and Wertman 1993, 92.

⁵⁷ In general, one can also note that in Italy the model performs much better than in the other three countries. The variance explained by this model in Italy is twice as good as the adjusted R^2 in the other countries here considered.

⁵⁸ Marcus 1988; 2000; 2002.

⁵⁹ Scott 1966, 82.

⁶⁰ Marcus 1991.

⁶¹ For two different viewpoints on this, see Zajonc 1982 and Lazarus 1984.

⁶² See Marcus, 1988; 1991 and 2000.

⁶³ Marcus 1988.

⁶⁴ Marcus 1988, 742.

⁶⁵ The analysis presented in Figure 1 reports the results for only three countries: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In Italy, one of the items – “cooperative” – was not offered. Including Italy (i.e. excluding the cooperative item) does not change the results.

⁶⁶ Smith and Wertman 1992, 101.

⁶⁷ Stimson 1991, 36-39.

⁶⁸ I first normalized the four series starting from the raw data in Figure 2 and then converting them into an index computed as 100 plus the percentage of those in favor of the United States, minus the percentage of those opposed to the United States. I then standardized each score, using the mean average and standard deviation across the four series. These calculations were done for all four series.

⁶⁹ In Figure 2, the 2003 data overlook this recovery being an yearly average of different surveys, but that it is there can be seen from the raw data in figure 1. Positive feelings go from a net average feeling of 47 down to -7 in February 2003, to the all time lowest -31 in March 2003 (the start of the Iraqi war) and then rising again and becoming positive already in April 2003.

⁷⁰ Pierson 2000.

⁷¹ Lundestad 2002.

⁷² Luzzato-Fegiz 1956, 781-782.

⁷³ HICOG Report n.6, March 6, 1950, quoted in Merritt and Merritt 1980, 58.

⁷⁴ Luzzato-Fegiz 1956, 668 and 670.

⁷⁵ In January 1948, 78 percent of the Italians, 91 percent of the French (they were 72 percent in August and November 1947, according to Gallup) and 89 percent of the British (they were 40 percent in July 1947) had heard or read about the Marshall Plan. In a survey carried out in April-May 1948 by Elmo Roper for Time, 74 percent of the Italians, 80 percent of the British and 90 percent of the French had heard of the Marshall Plan, while 55, 50 and 61 percent, respectively, had heard of the Western European Union (Vielemeier, 1991: 589-590).

⁷⁶ Luzzato-Fegiz 1956, 700-701.

⁷⁷ Lunderstad 1993.

⁷⁸ Buchanan and Cantril 1953 table 4, 34.

⁷⁹ E.g. Spiro 1968; Markovits 2004.

⁸⁰ The analysis including the threat variables covers the period 1956-1960, because the question was never asked after that date. Excluding the threat variables for the

four cases covers the period 1955-1969. If we exclude Great Britain, the analysis moves on to 1970.

⁸¹ Altogether, 68,690 persons were asked a question on their anti-American feelings during this time-span.

⁸² The mean value, across all cases and time-points, is 1.84 (on a range from one to five), with a standard deviation of 1.28 points (and a mode of 1).

⁸³ Firebaugh 1997; Duncan and Kalton 1987.

⁸⁴ Firebaugh 1989.

⁸⁵ See Firebaugh 1987: 42 and ff. In vector form, the model is the following: $E(Y) = \alpha + X\beta + \gamma D_{yr} + \delta (X D_{yr}) + \varepsilon$. In this model, D_{yr} is a dummy variable assuming value 1 for each year, X is a vector of all the independent variables excluding the dummy variables and the interaction terms, and $(X D_{yr})$ is a subset of relevant interaction terms. In the general model, unless otherwise indicated, I set as baseline the year 1955 and α is the intercept for that year; ε is the error term. The β coefficients are the time-invariant impact of each regressor on our dependent variable and the δ coefficients are the change in the impact of each regressor on our dependent variable in each specific interval between 1955 and the specific year. Therefore we included as many dummies D_{yr} as the years minus one. Also for the interaction terms we used 1955 as a baseline and the other years as interactive terms set to 1 when relevant. In this model, the interaction terms are the indicators of whether each independent variable has changed its impact over time.

⁸⁶ The results using subjective SES as an indicator are not shown, but they are always in the expected direction. To increase the sample size – SES indicator has been used less regularly than education – all subsequent analyses report only education.

⁸⁷ E.g. Spiro 1968 and Markovits, 2004.

⁸⁸ Azar et al. 1972.