THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

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Over their long history, democratic governments have undergone extraordinary changes in their scope and institutions. These changes were a result mainly of altered historical circumstances that seemed to require different ways of translating democratic ideas and goals into reality. They also resulted in part from changes in the interpretation of democratic ideas and goals. Yet a core of beliefs about the fundamental requirements of democracy has, I think, persisted.

In quite recent years, a new and rather disturbing change seems to have taken place in some of the oldest and seemingly most secure democracies—that is to say, in democratic countries. Many citizens appear to have lost confidence in their key political institutions—parliament, for example. And yet, paradoxically, that loss of confidence has not, at least so far, eroded citizens’ support for democracy, which remains surprisingly strong. Does this paradox reflect no more than a simple-minded self-contradiction, made possible by shallow and faulty thinking among ordinary citizens? Or does it reveal something deeper about the nature of democracy? And what, if anything, does it portend for the future?

Before turning to these questions, let me first mention some important earlier changes in the theory and practice of democratic government.

DEMOCRACY’S PAST: THREE IMPORTANT CHANGES

1. The territorial locus of democratic governments vastly increased in size.

In a change that has had enormous consequences, the theory and practice of democratic and republican government shifted from the smaller site of the city-state to the nation-state, or, more accurately, the national state or country. As we all know,
from about 500 BCE to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, democratic and republican ideas and practices were generally thought to be applicable only to very small units, notably city-states. Even when a city-state expanded far beyond its original boundaries, as Rome did, the political institutions that were thought to be appropriate for the city-state were largely maintained as they had been, even though the older political institutions were unsuitable for extensive citizen participation in governing the vastly expanded republic.

The conviction that popular governments must exist among a comparatively small body of citizens confined to rather small territorial units still prevailed widely in 1787 when the Framers of the American Constitution assembled to design a constitution for a representative republic that would govern over a huge and indefinitely expanding territory. Many of the delegates, including one of its principal architects, James Madison, were distinctly aware that what they were attempting contradicted prevailing wisdom. To be sure, none of the delegates seriously doubted that democratic government might be appropriate for units small enough to permit citizens to assemble, such as a town. Moreover, their experience with colonial governments also indicated that some sort of popular government might even be feasible on the larger scale of the existing American states. That a popular government could exist on the scale of a union of all thirteen states was, however, highly dubious, and if American boundaries continued to expand, as everyone agreed they would, the likelihood of a stable popular government approached zero.

Yet by the 1830s, when Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States, the older doctrine had lost its force, thanks largely to the plain fact, as Tocqueville famously portrayed it, that democracy (at least by the standards of the time) actually existed in the United States. The country had now become the obvious locus of democratic government.

To be sure, this extraordinary expansion in scale required a new set of political institutions that, taken as a whole, had never existed in the older republics—a legislature of elected representatives, for example, plus political parties, plus a multiplicity of associations (interest groups, we might say today) that Tocqueville
found both essential and praiseworthy. Although we often assume today that democracy refers to a large-scale representative government, the adoption of representation and the election of representatives as essential elements required extraordinary changes in the institutions and practices of democratic government, and, I would say, in the attitudes, beliefs, ethos, and political culture of citizens and leaders.

Let me now jump briefly to the future. Looking back a century hence, will observers view democracy in the national state rather as we view democracy in the city-state—as desirable in its time, perhaps, but rendered hopelessly obsolete by an inevitable shift to units governing on a transnational scale?

2. National Democratic Governments Vastly Increased the Scope of their Activities.

During the past century the scale of democratic governments has also increased along another dimension: democratic governments have expanded prodigiously in the scope of the programs and policies they undertake. They do more, much more, than they once did. The magnitude of this expansion in the scope of democratic governments is revealed, among other ways, by the huge growth in the number of programs and policies that require government expenditures, transfers, revenues, regulations, and so on. Viewing the scope of government from a somewhat different angle, democratic governments have also expanded in their protection of rights, privileges, and entitlements.

The change in the scope of government shows up sharply in an extraordinary increase in government revenues and expenditures. As a percentage of GDP, taxes rose from 1950 to 1990 in seventeen European countries by 40%. Overall government receipts increased by nearly 70%. In 1990, government receipts averaged 45% of GDP, ranging from 64% in Sweden and around 56% in both Norway and Denmark to 34% in Greece. Government receipts were high even in the poorest countries: 38% in Portugal and Spain and 34% in Greece.¹

Even political leaders like Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in Britain, who decried tax burdens and the welfare state, made little dent in
government revenues and outlays. Among nineteen older democratic countries, the total outlays of general governments were, on average, a little under half of GDP in 1990 and remained virtually unchanged in 1997. The extremes ranged from around 60% in Sweden to about 31% in Japan and the United States.²

Although some classic liberals feared that increasing the scope of government programs and policies would wreak great harm to individual liberties and ultimately even threaten the survival of democratic institutions, experience appears to confound their fears. Indeed, evidence suggests that the relationship just might be the inverse. It is in the mature democracies, which have the largest governments measured by their role in the economy, that civil and political liberties are most secure.³ Given the fact that a substantial part of their large government expenditures go to health, education, income maintenance, and the like, it is not surprising that these democratic countries also rank highest on assorted indicators of human development.⁴ Bigger governments are, it appears, better.⁵

3. Democracy has become the prevailing form of legitimate government.

We are all aware that democratic or preponderantly democratic governments have been adopted in a vastly greater number of countries than ever before in world history. After allowing for some latitude in deciding on the cut-off point between a democratic and a non-democratic government, out of a world total of about 192 countries I count about 86 countries as “democratic.” These contain more than half the world’s population.

Let me suggest a half dozen changes in conditions that help to explain the global expansion of democracy.⁶

- Foreign intervention and influence hostile to democratic institutions have declined, while international support for democracy has increased. The most important source of overt antidemocratic intervention, particularly in Central Europe, collapsed along with the Soviet Union; the less overt U.S. support for military regimes in Latin America was largely reversed in the 1980s; and international organizations
ranging from the U.N. to the World Bank began, even if timidly, to support democratization. The world climate, then, has become much more favorable for the introduction and survival of democratic governments.

- During the last quarter of the century, military dictatorships were badly discredited by their failures—political, economic, and, in Argentina, even military. Thus the most frequent internal threat to democracy and the predominant source of coups against it has greatly diminished, while the control over military and police by elected civilian leaders has been strengthened.

- Enormous changes have occurred during the twentieth century in the relative strength of democratic and antidemocratic ideologies and beliefs in different countries. During the first part of the century, support for monarchy, hereditary aristocracy, and oligarchy, which had hitherto been the most common forms of nondemocratic government, greatly declined. During the next quarter century, the main nondemocratic ideologies and the governments that supported them—Fascism, Nazism, Soviet Communism—were finally destroyed by their own disastrous failures, military, economic, political. Although antidemocratic ideologies, such as extreme nationalism and religious fundamentalism, are persistent obstacles to democratization in some countries, on a world scale they lack the appeal of democracy. The importance of democratic ideas in creating and maintaining legitimacy is revealed by the frequency with which authoritarian governments attempt to cloak their regime in pseudo-democratic rhetoric.

- Severe cultural conflicts pose a serious obstacle to the stability of a democratic government. Consequently, much of the global expansion of democracy has occurred in countries with a relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity or where cultural differences exist in ways that tend not to cause intense conflict. In addition, however, in some countries with a high potential for cultural conflict, like South Africa, the transition to democracy and its subsequent consolidation have been facilitated by carefully designed electoral arrangements and political practices that encourage political inclusion and compromise rather than exclusion and conflict.

- Finally, the spread of capitalist market economies and, in some countries, their
displacement of centrally directed economic systems have helped to create social structures, attitudes, and demands more favorable to democratic beliefs, practices, and institutions. In many countries, market capitalism has spurred economic growth, increased living standards, and generated a larger middle class. As the society and economy of these countries changed, more people began to demand many features of a civil society that are favorable to the emergence and stability of democratic institutions: education, freedom of inquiry and communication, property rights, the rule of law, political participation, respect for the rights of opposition, and others demands that directly or indirectly help to support democratic political institutions. Thus the global spread of market capitalism has been accompanied by an increase in the number of countries with civil societies more favorable to democratic institution standards.

DEMOCRACY’S PARADOXICAL PRESENT

The Paradox: In many of the oldest and most stable democratic countries, citizens possess little confidence in some key democratic institutions. Yet most citizens continue to believe in the desirability of democracy.

Let me offer some of the most telling evidence for this paradox.

- In his study of the four Southern European democracies, Leonardo Morlino found a discrepancy between the low levels of satisfaction with “the way democracy works” and the high levels of belief in the view that democracy is preferable to any other regime.7

- More recently, Hans-Dieter Klingemann has shown that in the most highly democratic countries, including those both of older creation and of newer vintage, a very high proportion of citizens support democracy as an ideal form of government. Yet with few exceptions, only a minority of citizens in these countries have much confidence in the performance of their governments.8

- Contrary to some previous work indicating that rather low levels of confidence in government performance have been a steady state, a forthcoming multi-
authored work on the Trilateral Democracies presents impressive evidence showing that in a disturbing number of the advanced democratic countries citizens’ confidence in several major democratic institutions has undergone a significant decline since the 1980s or earlier. In these countries, citizens have significantly less confidence, for example, in the extent to which politicians and parliaments care about their opinions. On a scale of confidence in five public institutions, in the early 1990s confidence had dropped significantly from the previous decade in all but two of seventeen countries. The causes of the decline are by no means clear and may well vary in different countries.

Yet as in the other work I just mentioned, these studies of the Trilateral Democracies show that the decline in confidence in political institutions has not been accompanied by a decline in confidence in democracy. On the contrary, despite their disdain for some key democratic political institutions, citizens in these countries continue to express high levels of support for democracy as a system.

What are we to make of this paradox? And what does it mean for the future?

*Understanding the paradox: What do people mean by democracy? Why do they value it?*

If people in democratic countries continue to express their support for democracy, what is it, exactly, that they wish to support? What do they value about a democratic system? How can people who seem to have little regard for actual democratic institutions and leaders nonetheless strongly approve of democracy as the best system of government?

It is ironical, if not downright shocking, that amidst the enormous amount of survey data about democratic institutions, political participation, attitudes, ideologies, beliefs, and what-not, we have astoundingly little evidence in answer to a seemingly simple question: When people say they support democracy, what is it that they wish to support? So far as I am aware, the evidence is sparse.
A Theoretical Digression: Two Dimensions of Democracy.

Before examining such evidence as I have been able to find, let me call attention to certain aspects of democracy both as an ideal and as a set of actual practices and institutions. Sometimes we conceive of democracy as an ideal, goal, aim, or standard, one that is perhaps unachievable but nonetheless highly relevant not only for classifying and judging political systems (e.g., as democratic or nondemocratic, more democratic or less democratic, moving toward greater democracy or toward a decline in democracy), but also for fashioning strategies of democratization, designing appropriate political institutions, and so on. At other times, however, we judge actual systems to be democratic, even though they fall short, probably far short, of the ideal, as when we say that the United States, France, and Sweden, for example, are democracies. It is possible, though we cannot be altogether certain, that many citizens think of democracy in both ways: as an ideal to be attained and also as an actually existing government exemplified, at least in important ways, in their own political system.

Although no model of democracy can claim universal acceptability, it is useful, I find, to consider ideal democracy as a political system that might be designed for members of an association who were willing to treat one another, for political purposes, as political equals. The members of the association might, and indeed almost certainly would, view one another as unequal in other respects. But as I have suggested elsewhere, if they were to assume that all of them possess equal rights to participate fully in making the policies, rules, laws, or other decisions that they are expected (or required) to obey, then the government of their association would, ideally, have to satisfy several criteria. Let me list them here without amplification. To be fully democratic an association would have to provide rights and opportunities for effective participation, voting equality, opportunities for acquiring adequate understanding of the relevant alternative policies and their likely consequences, and means by which the citizen body could maintain adequate control of the agenda of government policies and decisions. Finally, if the association is a state, then to be fully democratic as we now understand the ideal it would need to insure that all or at any
rate most adult permanent residents under its jurisdiction would possess the full rights of citizens that are implied by the first four criteria. I need hardly add that although most democrats today would consider the full inclusion specified by this criterion to be a necessary requirement if a state is to be governed democratically, before the twentieth century most advocates of democracy would have rejected it. Here then is a change in our understanding of the democratic ideal and its requirements.

As we all know, the democratic ideal I have just described is too demanding to be fully achieved in the actual world of human society. So we need to ask: under the imperfect conditions of the real world, what political institutions would be necessary in order to achieve democratic goals so far as may be possible in governing an actual state? And by an actual state, I now mean, as we generally do today, a state capable of governing a large-scale unit, of the magnitude of a country in our present world.

In answering, we need always to keep in mind that certain political institutions might be necessary for approximating ideal democracy to an important extent, but they might not be sufficient for fully closing the gap between ideal democracy and real democracy. Indeed, as is almost always the case with highly demanding ideals, we have every reason to suppose that even under the most favorable circumstances the gap will remain quite large. In short, judged against the exacting standards set by democratic ideals, real democracy as we know it is almost sure to be quite far from fully democratic.

Briefly, the minimal set of political institutions necessary for modern representative democratic government to exist in a political unit the size of a country—a system I have sometimes called polyarchy—appear to be these:

1. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens. Thus modern, large-scale democratic governments are representative.

2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.

3. Citizens have a right to express themselves without danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the
government, its policies, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology.

4. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative and independent sources of information from other citizens, experts, newspapers, magazines, books, telecommunications, and the like. Moreover, alternative sources of information actually exist that are not under the control of the government or any other single group attempting to influence public political beliefs and attitudes, and these alternative sources are effectively protected by law.

5. To achieve their various rights, including those required for the effective operation of democratic political institutions, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.

6. No adult permanently residing in the country and subject to its laws can be denied the rights that are available to others and are necessary to the five political institutions just listed. These include the rights to vote in the election of officials in free and fair elections; to run for elective office; to free expression; to form and participate in independent political organizations; to have access to independent sources of information; and rights to other freedoms and opportunities that may be necessary to the effective operation of the political institutions of large-scale democracy.

If we reflect on the ideal criteria and the political institutions they require for a large-scale democratic government in the actual world of human societies, we can detect at least two dimensions. I am going to call them the First and Second Dimensions of Democracy.

As to the First Dimension, each criterion and each political institution presupposes the existence of an enforceable set of rights and opportunities, rights and opportunities that citizens may choose to exercise and act on. The criteria of ideal democracy imply, for example, a right held by citizens to have one's vote counted equally. So, too, the political institutions of actual democracy all imply as necessary to them certain rights and opportunities. Indeed, they imply a complex body of
enforceable rights and opportunities: to participate in electing representatives; to freedom of expression, inquiry, discussion, and deliberation in the widest sense; to form associations with others for inquiry and political action; rights and opportunities to citizenship; and more. These rights and opportunities are not merely abstract moral obligations. They must exist in order for the basic democratic institutions themselves to exist, not simply on paper but as effective rights and opportunities that are enforceable and enforced by law and practice. A country without them would, as a consequence, also lack the fundamental political institutions required for democracy.

But having rights and opportunities is not strictly equivalent to using them. That I possess the right to discuss politics freely with my fellow citizens does not necessarily mean that I will actually engage in political discussion. I may even choose not to vote—as a great many American and Swiss citizens do. The Second Dimension of democracy, then, is actual participation in political life. Obviously this Second Dimension is important. The continuing existence of democratic order would seem to require that citizens, or at least some of them, sometimes do actually participate in political life by exercising their rights and act on the opportunities guaranteed to them.

Yet it is an all too common mistake to interpret democracy as if it were embodied only in its Second Dimension, to see democracy simply as a matter of political participation, and to assume that if some people in democratic countries say they value democracy it must be because they receive enjoyment or satisfaction from actually participating in political life. And if it turns out that they do not particularly enjoy participating in political life and do not engage much in it, then it might seem to follow that they do not care much about democracy.

As should be obvious by now, to view democracy in this fashion is simply wrong. It is wrong because it ignores what may well be the most important element of democracy, its First Dimension. In short, this mistaken view overlooks the fundamental political rights and opportunities that, both as an ideal and an actuality, are intrinsic elements of democracy,
What Do Surveys Show?

Nearly a half-century of surveys provides overwhelming evidence, I think, that citizens do not put much value on actually participating themselves in political life. If democracy were to consist only of its Second Dimension, then a majority of citizens in democratic countries would give it at best their weak support and at worst none at all. For some years now surveys have revealed over and over again that few citizens in any democratic country participate in political life in ways other than voting, or perhaps occasionally signing a petition. With most people even discussing politics is by no means a frequent event. Thus, “for the European Community as a whole, averaged over the entire period 1973-92 . . . 17 percent said they discussed politics frequently, and 34 percent said that they never do so.” Yet the fact that many citizens do not take full advantage of all the rights and opportunities provided by a democratic system should not be interpreted to mean that they are indifferent to their possession of these rights and opportunities. Indeed, when so many people in democratic countries say they value democracy might they not value it primarily for its First Dimension, rather than the Second?

Lamentably, it is precisely on this question that the plentiful flow of survey evidence diminishes to a trickle. Luckily, this trickle consists of several surveys in West Germany and the Netherlands. When respondents in those countries were asked to indicate the necessary characteristics of democracy, the results were striking. To an overwhelming proportion of people, the necessary features were precisely those of the First Dimension. What is more, for whatever it may be worth, a survey taken in East Germany in 1990 showed that respondents there also identified the same characteristics. But if this is what people mean by democracy, then it is, I think, a small and entirely permissible move to conclude that when citizens in these countries, and probably elsewhere, indicate that they support “democracy”, what they have in mind are the values and institutions of the First Dimension.

If that is so, then we have here the explanation of our paradox. Although a majority of citizens in most democratic countries may view participating in political life as neither very urgent nor particularly rewarding, and though many may be dissatisfied
with the way their government works, overwhelming majorities of citizens do value the rights and opportunities their democratic system of government provides to them. To be sure, they may not often exercise their rights and seize their opportunities. Yet their views are definitely not internally inconsistent. Even if dissatisfaction with the way their government works might, in the long run, weaken the confidence of some citizens in the value of the First Dimension of democracy, other citizens may conclude that they will have to participate more actively in political life in order to mend the defects they see in the operation of their democratic government.

They are less likely to do so, however, unless they possess some idea of plausible remedies and solutions. Has not the time arrived, then, when political scientists, constitutional lawyers, and others who are concerned about the future of democracy should take up this challenge and look for feasible solutions?
DEMOCRACY’S FUTURE: SOME SPECULATIONS

Will a belief in the desirability of democracy, which so many citizens in democratic countries seem to possess, withstand future challenges?

It is easy to dream up possible scenarios, but impossible, I think, to gauge with much accuracy their probability or consequences. Among many possible challenges five look to me as likely to be particularly important.

- One is the perennial challenge of achieving a desirable balance between the needs of the two basic systems, political and economic. In a democratic political order citizens ought to be relatively equal in their political resources and thus in their capacities for influencing government policies and decisions. But in the economic order automatically generates vast inequalities in the distribution of resources that are readily convertible into political resources. Both systems, economic and political, are by a large measure more desirable than any feasible alternatives now in sight. But they are not a happy couple.17

- Although international organizations have become the locus of important decisions and will doubtless be even more so in the future, they are not now and probably will not be governed democratically. Instead they will continue to be governed mainly by bargaining among bureaucratic and political elites, operating within extremely wide limits set by treaties and international agreements.

- Public policies, including of course foreign affairs, may continue to increase so greatly in complexity as to impose even greater obstacles to public understanding. Yet the institutions for facilitating public understanding that have developed over the past century and earlier—literacy, education, a free press, political campaigns, and others—no longer seem up to the task of public enlightenment.

- As a result of legal and illegal immigration and a sharp rise in what is sometimes called the politics of identity, cultural diversity and cleavages are increasing in almost all of the older democratic countries. Distasteful as the thought may be, we know that cultural diversity tends to stimulate conflicts that are extremely difficult to
resolve peacefully by means of civil discourse and compromise and therefore threaten to inspire actions that might impair basic democratic rights and opportunities.

- Finally, I must mention the possibility of attacks on major cities—New York, Washington, London, Paris, for example—by terrorists employing small and easily transported nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons that can cause enormous devastation, death, and disease. The human costs of terrorist attacks employing these extremely lethal and easily concealed technologies could stimulate strong demands for severe restrictions on civil rights, to the detriment of the democratic process.

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Are these dangers little more than “a parade of imaginary horribles,” as a distinguished justice of the United States Supreme Court referred many years ago to a brief presented to the Court? Probably not. I am inclined to think that we cannot so easily dismiss the challenges I just mentioned. Is it not possible, then, that under their impact confidence in the value of democracy might erode badly in democratic countries where citizens are already seriously discontented with their key political institutions?

Perhaps not. We need always to keep in mind that in many countries, particularly some where political confidence has declined most sharply, democratic systems have proved to be extraordinarily sturdy. They have managed to weather through major economic depression, mass unemployment, inflation, war, and inept or scandalous leadership. That a democracy is able to survive its challenges requires, among other things, citizens who are reasonably confident that the essential qualities of a democratic order make it clearly superior to any feasible nondemocratic alternative, and so remain immune to the temptations of authoritarianism. The evidence we have, imperfect though it may be, seems to indicate that many people in democratic countries not only understand what these basic qualities are but also value them highly.
Yet it would be wrong, I believe, to take recent signs of civic discontent too lightly. As I said earlier, discontent with the way democratic governments operate presents a challenge to political scientists, constitutional lawyers, and political leaders to discover remedies for the institutional defects that citizens perceive. If this challenge were to occupy a significant place in the work of political scientists, it would not only keep many of us fruitfully occupied for a long time to come. Our contributions might even help to keep democracy alive and healthy through the coming century.

NOTES

1. For the moment, I’ll use the terms democratic, republican, and popular government interchangeably, that is, a government accountable to a substantial fraction of adult males. Despite an often cited assertion by James Madison, in eighteenth century America the terms democratic and republican were not sharply distinguished. Indeed, the political party that Madison and Thomas Jefferson founded was known successively as the Republican, the Democratic Republican, and finally the Democratic Party, the name it has borne since the 1820s.


3 As shown by the record of the 22 countries continuously democratic since 1950 or earlier. For these I have drawn on Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Governments in Twenty-One Countries. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), to which I have added Costa Rica. With three exceptions all receive the highest score, 1, on the rankings by Freedom House on its scale for Political Rights. On its Civil Liberties scale, Belgium, Costa Rica, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom receive a score of 2, the rest a score of 1.


5 After measuring the size of the public sector by such variables as transfers, subsidies, and government consumption as percentages of GDP, and public sector employment as a percent of total population, the authors of one recent study of government performance in 152 countries conclude that “bigger governments, while taxing more, look better on just about every measure of performance. This result—that the larger governments tend to be the higher quality ones—is one of our key findings.” Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “The Quality of Government,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, 1999, pp. 222-279.

6 Mea culpa. In Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) I speculated that because so many countries lacked the conditions favoring polyarchy that I had described there—essentially those listed above—it would be “unrealistic to suppose . . . that there will be any dramatic change in the number of polyarchies within a generation of two.” (p. 208). Obviously I did not foresee that these favorable conditions would expand rapidly in the years to come, and thus events, happily, falsified my pessimistic prediction. I would contend, however, that
they confirmed my theory that a democratic polyarchy is likely to develop in any country where these conditions are present.

7 *Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties, Groups, and Citizens in Southern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Table 3.3, p. 118, Figure 7.1, p. 298.

8 Among nine countries with democratic governments over 40 years, the mean support for democracy in 1996 was 88%, ranging from 75% in Finland to 93% in West Germany, Norway, and Sweden. Among 13 democratic systems less than 40 years in duration, support averaged 86%, ranging from 78% in Brazil to 95% in Croatia. In contrast, among the older democracies only 32% of the citizens on average rated the performance of their governments highly. Except for Norway (70%) only a minority of citizens ranked the performance of their governments as “high,” ranging from 46% in Switzerland to 12% in Japan. “Performance” on a 13 point scale combined “performance of the system for governing,” “performance of people in national office,” “confidence in parliament,” and “confidence in government.” “Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis,” in Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens, Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9, pp. 46-49.

9 These are the seventeen “Trilateral Democracies” described in the 1975 report of the Trilateral Commission.


12 In North Ireland and France the small decline was not statistically significant. In the Netherlands it was significant at p<.05, in the others at p<.01. (Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris, “Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture, or Performance,” in Putnam et al. Table 3.3, p. 92).

13 Although, as Robert Putnam has suggested, a decline in “social capital” may account for the decline in confidence in some countries, Susan Pharr argues convincingly that in Japan the decline is primarily a result of citizens’ perception of official corruption. That may also be true in Italy, France, and Germany. Putnam et al., “Chapter 8. Officials’ Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies,” pp. 255ff.


17 I leave this problem and the three that follow undeveloped here for lack of space and because I have described them more fully elsewhere. On the tension between a market economy and democracy see *On Democracy*, Ch. 13, “Why Market-Capitalism Favors Democracy,” and Ch. 14, “Why Market-Capitalism Harms Democracy,” pp. 145-179. This is only one of my efforts over many years to work away at the problem of a market economy in the context of democratic theory and practice, beginning in 1940 with an article “On The Theory of Democratic Socialism,”* Plan Age,*